The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited. To contact the publisher: http://www.law.sc.edu/jlawedhp.htm

ELIZABETH D. KAISER

INTRODUCTION
If one is to believe the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, public school teachers walk a constitutional tightrope every day in class. They violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment when they lead students in pledging allegiance to the American flag, "one Nation, under God."(FN1) Regardless of whether the Ninth Circuit is correct on this issue, the fact remains that teachers face several constitutional challenges at work. In fact, teachers can threaten Establishment Clause values when they engage in the seemingly innocuous activity of instructing about religion in a world history course. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has stated that the mere inclusion of religion as a subject in the public school curriculum does not offend constitutional principles.(FN2) But it has left open the possibility that certain pedagogic choices might. What if a teacher decides to use the textbook A History of Western Society by Houghton Mifflin? That textbook contains the following description of the Islamic prophet Mohammed:

[H]e had been subject to seizures during which he completely lost consciousness and had visions .... The religion Mohammed founded is called Islam .... Mohammed described his visions in verse form and used these verses as his Koran. The subtle and complex reasoning Christianity had acquired by the seventh century was absent from early Islam. Nor did Islam emphasize study and learning as did Judaism .... The faith of Allah united the Arabs sufficiently to redirect their warlike energies. Hostilities were launched outward.(FN3)

By offering this incorrect account of Islam, a well-intentioned public school teacher might create the impression among her students that Islam is disfavored. Given the power and influence of teachers and schools over students, such a lesson might even discourage students from professing or practicing Islam. In other contexts, courts might well find that certain adverse effects raise significant Establishment Clause issues. Yet courts, for good reason, might be wary of policing pedagogic choices. The question is how to balance these important concerns.
This article argues for creating a new legal test to determine when religion in the public school curriculum violates constitutional principles. Part I discusses why public schools are making religion an increasingly important part of the social studies curriculum. Part II discusses how pedagogic choices surrounding religion in the curriculum may create unconstitutional effects. Part III explores the utility of current legal tests on religion in the curriculum. Part IV proposes three new legal methods of analysis for this type of conduct and recommends the best one.

I. RELIGION IS PLAYING AN INCREASINGLY LARGE ROLE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Nowhere is America's reputation as the "great melting pot" more prevalent than in today's public schools. By the year 2040, minorities are projected to represent more than half of America's K-12 student population.(FN4) With this increase in minority student population has come a change in attitude about how religious content should be treated in the classroom. Whereas in the 1970s many schools purged religion from the classroom, now those same schools are actively trying to incorporate the perspectives of many world religions into the curriculum.(FN5)
The movement to put religion in American classrooms is national in scope. The National Center for History in the Schools (NCHS), which guides many school districts in developing curriculum, listed religion as a critical element of history.(FN6) For world history in grades 5-12, the organization recommended the study of Christianity, Confucianism, Daoism, Brahmanism and Hinduism.(FN7) For United States History, NCHS recommended that students study religions that are representative of the modern population in order to understand "religious diversity and its impact on American institutions and values ...."(FN8) Though NCHS is not a governmental entity, it does get substantial funding from the United States Department of Education and the National Endowment for the Humanities to write the standards. Many school districts use the NCHS standards as a guide when planning their own curriculum.(FN9)
Education policy experts, and even some judges, have also supported a curricular policy of religious inclusion in the public schools. As Warren Nord and Charles Haynes have advocated in their book, Taking Religion Seriously Across the Curriculum, a school that teaches nothing about religion minimizes the importance of religion in history and science.(FN10) A curriculum that does not cover religion would "[marginalize] religion in our intellectual and cultural life, (implicitly) conveying the sense that religion is irrelevant in the search for truth in the various domains of the curriculum ...."(FN11) Supreme Court Justice Goldberg expressed similar sentiments twenty-five years earlier in School District v. Schempp.(FN12) In that case, the Court struck down a school policy that required students to read the Bible every morning because it violated the school's duty as a government actor to remain neutral towards religion.(FN13) However, Goldberg made sure to warn that the holding did not advocate complete expulsion of religious content from the curriculum in the name of government neutrality.

Untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious.(FN14)

Other commentators also advocate a greater role of religion in the curriculum. Noting the legal minefield teachers face when dealing with religion in the public school classroom, Lindsey Forson from Texas A&M University explains that teachers avoid the topic at the peril of students.

If not for the tragic events of Sept. 11, the current public school procedure would probably remain unchallenged. But in the months following this national tragedy, it became clear that many schools' policies of not regarding religion would no longer be adequate.... A barrage of questions from students about Islam has caught teachers in public schools completely off guard, bringing to light the fact that schools do not currently train teachers in the [appropriate way] to handle questions of a religious nature.(FN15)

Yet including religion in public school curriculum is not without controversy. The family of seven-year-old Laura Greska is suing the Lemoinster public schools in Massachusetts for not allowing her to read "The First Christmas" to her classmates for show and tell.(FN16) The school says the book contains inappropriate Christian messages; Laura's lawyer says the school is showing a hostility toward religion.(FN17) In one Texas school district, Muslim parents objected when the district refused to remove The Terrorist by Carole B. Cooney from a list of recommended reading for middle schools.

In the opening chapter, 11-year-old Billy is killed by a package bomb handed to him in a London tube (subway) station. The rest of the book focuses on the efforts of his 16-year-old sister to find out who killed Billy and why. Without detailing the plot, let's just say that the killer turns out to be--you guessed it--a Muslim. Along the way, the reader gets a decidedly nasty view of Islam. Broad generalizations uncritically link Islam with terrorism, and many passages throughout the book portray Islam as a faith that oppresses women. Sound familiar? Sure it does. These are stereotypes widely believed in our society and frequently reinforced by the media. Unfortunately, this author makes little attempt to distinguish the Islamic faith as practiced by the vast majority of Muslims from various political movements that wrap themselves in the mantle of Islam. And no effort is made to offer more than one point of view about the role of women in Islam.(FN18)

After reviewing the book, the school district kept it on the reading list.(FN19) In Oklahoma, the State House passed a law requiring that all public school science textbooks "'acknowledge' one God as the creator of human life in the universe."(FN20) At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, a group of students sued the university for forcing incoming freshman to read a book about Islam.(FN21)
In Virginia, public school students must learn certain concepts about major world religions in order to get their high school diploma.(FN22) In order to teach students these concepts, the state requires schools to teach religion.(FN23) Individual school districts implement these religion requirements by creating their own curricula, training their teachers and selecting appropriate textbooks.(FN24) In theory, Virginia's board of education has in good faith created a curriculum that is neutral towards religion in that it covers several religions, requiring students to learn about these religions in the context of history.(FN25) However, in practice, a combination of factors could cause students to believe that some religions are better than others. Take for example the issue of how textbooks approach religion. Recall the passage from A History of Western Society quoted in the introduction. In another Houghton Mifflin book, A Message of Ancient Days, the text resorts to stereotyping when describing the Hindu religion.(FN26) The book describes Hindus as people who "choose to put aside their possessions and live in a forest ...."(FN27)
These blatantly wrong and stereotypical passages show bias against the values of Hinduism and Islam. While A Message of Days makes Hindus look primitive, A History of Western Society shows a preference towards the Christian and Jewish faiths.(FN28) If a teacher assigned these reading passages to young, impressionable students without correcting the passages' inaccuracies or prejudicial viewpoint, the teacher would be sending a message that Islam and Hinduism are "lesser" religions. As the Court has said in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe(FN29) and Lee v. Weisman,(FN30) K-12 educators have enormous coercive influence over their students. Students reading those uncorrected passages could conclude that their teachers, agents of the state, specifically disfavor those religions.(FN31) So even when a state has in good faith required schools to educate students about multiple religions, a school--through teacher ignorance or selection of poor textbooks or supplemental materials--could impermissibly violate its constitutional duty to maintain neutrality towards religion.

II. GOOD FAITH INSTRUCTIONAL CHOICES MAY PRODUCE BAD EFFECTS
The pedagogic choices surrounding religion in the curriculum may create bad effects that violate the Constitution. The Supreme Court has developed many Establishment and Free Exercise clause tests for measuring bad effects. However, the Court has not been clear on what precisely each test means or how they relate to each other. Nonetheless, each test suggests that there are several potential problems surrounding religion in the curriculum.
Courts have not specifically addressed the issue of religion in the social studies curriculum. However, the Court has maintained that public schools must uphold First Amendment principles as entities of the government. The First Amendment protects an individual's right to practice religion freely and prevents the government from establishing its own state religion.(FN32) The Free Exercise and Establishment clauses address concerns about religious persecutions.(FN33)

[James Madison] eloquently argued that a true religion did not need the support of law; that no person; either believer or non-believer, should be taxed to support a religious institution of any kind; that the best interest of a society required that the minds of men always be wholly free; and that cruel persecutions were the inevitable result of government-established religions.(FN34)

While the Court has emphasized that both clauses are bedrock constitutional principles of our nation,(FN35) it has struggled to construct a workable method of analysis in church and state cases.(FN36) In fact, the Court has developed three different types of tests for these kinds of cases: the Lemon, "endorsement," and "coercion" tests.
The Lemon test evaluates the purpose and effects of government conduct.(FN37) First, the statute or program at issue must have a secular legislative purpose.(FN38) Second, it must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.(FN39) Government conduct may fail the Lemon test on either prong.(FN40) As for the second prong, an impermissible effect would occur if the government indoctrinated religion, defined its recipients by reference to religion, and/or excessively entangled government with religion.(FN41) In Mitchell v. Helms,(FN42) a case subsequent to Lemon, a plurality of the Court argued that religiously neutral government conduct that did not favor nor disfavor religion would not be an impermissible effect.(FN43) Other cases subsequent to Lemon demonstrated the Court's disagreements over the neutrality issue.
Courts could apply the Lemon test to religious curriculum in public schools.(FN44) Under a Lemon analysis, if a school or teacher intentionally creates a biased or incorrect curriculum, the curriculum would violate the purpose prong of Lemon.(FN45) Under the second prong, a teacher could avoid violating Lemon by teaching in a religiously neutral manner.(FN46) For example, she could select materials and instructional methods according to educational criteria that did not favor nor disfavor religion.(FN47)
In addition to the Lemon test, the Supreme Court has also developed a more impressionistic legal analysis for Establishment Clause cases. This analysis is called the endorsement test, and it determines whether the government is sending a message of its endorsement or disapproval of religion.(FN48) If the Court finds that an objective observer (familiar with the history of the community) would perceive that the government conduct endorsed religion, then the conduct violates the Establishment Clause.(FN49) Justice O'Connor developed the test initially to help clarify the effects prong of the Lemon test. Soon though, the test developed into one in its own right.(FN50) The test was designed to protect against conveying "a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message."(FN51) The endorsement test is used in situations where a private group's message could be misconstrued as that of the government's like when a Christmas tree is displayed in a public square.(FN52)
However, the Court has also used the endorsement test as a tool to allow more religious speech in an academic setting. For example, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court allowed public funds to be used for a Christian magazine based on the outcome of the endorsement test.(FN53) In Rosenberger, the Court was asked to determine whether government funds should have been disbursed to a student-run Christian publication. Only by concluding that the speech was free of government endorsement could the government legally fund the magazine.(FN54) O'Connor said that the publication was not a public, government speaker since it was structurally independent from the university and its funding was "provided to the religious publication in a context that makes improbable any perception of government endorsement of the religious message ...."(FN55) Therefore, the magazine's speech was private speech that was not restricted by the Establishment or Free Exercise clauses. In essence, the Court used the endorsement test as a tool to increase religious speech in public universities.
Yet on the very same day it approved an endorsement analysis in Rosenberger, the Court also demonstrated eroding support for the test. In Capitol Square v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the local chapter of the Ku Klux Klan sought a public permit to display a cross in the area surrounding the statehouse that was owned by the state.(FN56) Though the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the decision, some justices demonstrated their lack of fondness for the endorsement test in Capitol Square.(FN57) The plurality held that the endorsement test was immaterial since the criteria to gain entry to the public forum were neutral and did not discriminate against or among religions.(FN58) In fact, the plurality argued that in cases involving the implementation of neutral policies, the endorsement test should not be used.(FN59) "We find it peculiar to say that government 'promotes' or 'favors' a religious display by giving it the same access to a public forum that all others enjoy."(FN60) Concurring justices criticized the plurality's attempt to kill the endorsement test.(FN61) O'Connor argued that the endorsement test still had a place in Establishment Clause analysis, even when neutral criteria were involved.(FN62) Justice Souter agreed.(FN63) By leaving out the endorsement test in their analysis, Justice Souter argued that the plurality had created "a serious loophole in the protection provided by the endorsement test...."(FN64) Since displaying the cross on the public square posed a slight risk of government endorsement in the eyes of an objective observer, both Justices Souter and O'Connor advocated placing a sign next to the cross indicating clearly and from a distance that the cross belonged to the KKK and not to the State.(FN65) Capitol Square left the endorsement test in disarray.(FN66)
Despite the Court's erratic use of the endorsement test, it could be used to determine whether religious curriculum in the public school classroom violates the Establishment Clause. The test would be whether an objective observer would perceive that a teacher has endorsed religion via classroom instruction, activities, curricular materials or other pedagogical activities.(FN67) For purposes of the endorsement test, assume that the teacher has no educational background in world religions. Also, assume that the teacher may be familiar with Christian traditions and history as a member of the local church. In a predominantly Christian community, several pedagogical choices and classroom circumstances could combine to send a message to students that non-Christian religions are disfavored. For example, the teacher could teach a unit about world religion by using various sources. Because she is more familiar with the history of Christianity, she may supplement textbook reading with outside sources to enhance student learning. But for Islam, a religion she knows less about, she could just stick to the classroom textbook. What if she uses A History of Western Society, the book that incorrectly claimed that the Muslim prophet Mohammed "had been subject to seizures during which he completely lost consciousness and had visions"?(FN68) In a classroom environment where the teacher is authoritarian, students may not know enough or be brave enough to correct the error-ridden instruction. These classroom circumstances could combine to convey a message to students that the teacher endorses Christianity and does not endorse Islam. The objective observer component of the endorsement test would prevent the test from being abused. For example, limiting the reach of the endorsement by confining it to the objective observer perspective keeps the test from barring every lesson on religion that is even mildly offensive to over-sensitive plaintiffs. It would also prevent schools from tailoring their curriculum to satisfy the desires of religious adherents, a practice that the Court deemed unconstitutional in Epperson.(FN69)
The third legal test raised in religion cases is the coercion test. Under this test, a court evaluates whether the government has coerced students into practicing religion in violation of the Free Exercise clause.(FN70) For example, in Lee v. Weisman, a public school impermissibly coerced students into prayer by having a rabbi lead an invocation at the school graduation ceremony.

The school district's supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction .... Standing or remaining silent can signify adherence to a view or simple respect for the views of others .... There can be no doubt that for many, if not most, of the students at the graduation, the act of standing or remaining silent was an expression of participation in the rabbi's prayer.(FN71)

However, in the two cases in which the Supreme Court has used this test, only a plurality agreed that coercion was the decisive factor in finding that the conduct was constitutionally impermissible.(FN72)
The coercion test acknowledges the fact that the environment of a school is inherently coercive.(FN73) For example, one of the many reasons why the Court found a graduation prayer in Lee v. Weisman to be unconstitutional was because "there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools ...."(FN74) In a school setting, many students who might object to coercive religious activities might feel too intimidated to complain about it to school officials.(FN75) "This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion."(FN76) In Santa Fe, a student speaker election process was unconstitutional because high school student voters were vulnerable to peer pressure and would likely succumb to the majoritarian Christian viewpoint.(FN77) Combined with the fact that the process was endorsed by the school board, the Court found that the school was unconstitutionally coercing its students into prayer.(FN78)
Traditionally, the coercion test has been used to prevent schools from coercing students into performing a specific religious activity, since such coercion violates a student's Free Exercise clause rights. However, the coercion test could apply to Free Exercise rights challenged by religious brainwashing--that is misrepresenting information about certain religions. For example, in the case of teaching about Hindu and Islam using textbooks with incorrect information, the teacher is arguably coercing students into believing that what they are learning is truthful and factual. In a school setting where a young student does not have the knowledge base to correct their teacher, nor the courage to withstand the peer pressure from their classmates to adopt these views, the school is using its authority to persuade students to not practice those religions that are negatively portrayed in the curriculum. Whether the school has intended the curriculum to be negative or not, a student will probably not practice Islam if their teacher tells them that all Muslims are warlike.(FN79)
The coercion test could also apply to those situations where arguably religious activity is invoked in subject areas other than social studies. Take for example, a physical education teacher who leads a group of impressionable seventh graders in a yoga class. Though the teacher may intend the activity to be only for relaxation, the students may feel coerced into engaging in the mock prayer. Under certain conditions such as a dimly-lit gym, background chanting music, forced attendance in gym class, a student may feel that their classroom instruction comes perilously close to religious worship.

III. THE UTILITY OF EXISTING LEGAL TESTS IN DETERMINING WHETHER RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM COMPLIES WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
The issue is not that simple, however. As scholars have noted, the Lemon, endorsement and coercion tests normally apply to assess the unintended effects of conduct that the government intends.(FN80) Thus, the tests are awkward when applied to religion in the social studies and other curricula. Poor textbook selection is not a paradigm case. Even a seriously flawed textbook can be used by well-trained teachers as an educational tool to teach a factually-correct lesson about religion. On the other hand, any type of instruction or curricular material can be transformed into instruction that threatens constitutional principles. And problematic teaching merely reflects the fact that many public school teachers do not know: 1) that they have gaps in their knowledge; and 2) that their classroom conduct and instruction may unintentionally violate the First Amendment. No amount of "teacher-proofing" curricular materials can guarantee that a classroom lesson will not have unintended bad effects that threaten First Amendment principles. Even something as non-religious as math can pose constitutional problems that neither the Lemon, endorsement, or coercion tests can fix.
Take, for example, a lesson on calculating a square root. A combination of classroom factors such as: a darkened classroom, lit candles, chanting music, placing a picture of a mock square root 'god' on the front blackboard, and forcing the students to follow the teacher in a square root 'prayer' could transform this simple math lesson into something imper-missible. A teacher who would create this situation especially with younger students has clearly taken a well-intentioned pedagogical idea too far. Though the teacher may intend this activity to be relaxing, demystifying or just a joke, young impressionable students--and their parents who will hear about it at dinner--will absorb unintended bad effects from the conduct. First, this lesson arguably coerces students into religious worship. A second problem with this lesson is that it clearly mocks religious practices, perhaps sending a message of teacher's endorsement of non-religion. But because the teacher's conduct was unintentionally offensive to religious principles, the Lemon, endorsement and coercion tests would probably not be able to prohibit this activity
Furthermore, even if the traditional tests could be used, some scholars and courts have been reluctant to police pedagogic choices in this and other non-religious contexts.(FN81) From a purely pedagogical standpoint, Professor Funston points to the problems inherent in classroom decisions being made in the courtroom.(FN82) Primarily, judges would not "know what they were doing."(FN83) Education professionals are better able to evaluate the day-to-day curricular choices of teachers.(FN84) Secondly, legislatures have purposefully prevented judicial decision making in the classroom by creating elaborate educational bureaucracies to run schools and hear grievances.(FN85) Most importantly, holding schools liable for improper teaching would result in a reduction of educational services given the potential financial loss stemming from lawsuits.(FN86) This financial impact might inhibit teachers from teaching the subject of religion altogether.(FN87)
Some commentators also argue that judicial policing of religious K-12 curriculum is based on a flawed constitutional theory. Specifically, the flaw is that the endorsement test originated by Justice O'Connor is too fluid a doctrine to be useful as a tool of curricular regulation.(FN88) As Professor McConnell phrased it, "the bare concept of 'endorsement' therefore provides no guidance to legislatures or lower courts about what is an establishment of religion. It is nothing more than application to the Religion Clauses of the principle: 'I know it when I see it....'"(FN89) Given McConnell's aversion towards the endorsement test, it is highly unlikely that he would approve of using it to evaluate whether incorrect or biased teaching has resulted in government endorsement of religion.
Professor Smith also points out that the endorsement test was not meant to prohibit anything other than intentional acts of endorsement.(FN90) Endorsement is perceived, according to Justice O'Connor, by an 'objective observer' who is "familiar with the text, history and implementation of the statute under review."(FN91) Smith points out that if the observer in the endorsement test "knows what the legislators intended," then there is no reason to use the test.(FN92) Instead, the focus of a constitutional analysis of classroom behavior should be on intent.
Professor Strossen takes a slightly different approach, yet ultimately agrees with Smith that plaintiffs should only recover when teachers have intentionally created a curriculum that violates the Establishment Clause.(FN93) Based upon an intent analysis, if the school can prove that the teacher made his decisions based on educational principles and did not intend to convey a message of endorsement or non-endorsement, then the plaintiff's claim would fail.(FN94) However, Strossen's answer does not resolve the issue here of poorly trained teachers who unintentionally convey disapproval or approval of certain religions in classroom curricula.
Of course, using the modified Lemon, endorsement or coercion tests to evaluate curriculum might seem to contradict the holding of Falvo v. Owasso Independent School District.(FN95) In Falvo, the Tenth Circuit said courts should not try to protect constitutional principles by policing in-class conduct.(FN96) In that case, a school district condoned the practice of students grading each others' tests in the classroom and calling the grades aloud to the teacher.(FN97) The plaintiff claimed that the grading practice was a violation of Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights.(FN98) The appeals court disagreed, holding that the constitutional right to privacy did not extend to the test grades that were the subject of the grading practice in dispute.(FN99) "We cannot conclude that these grades are so highly personal or intimate that they fall within the zone of constitutional protection; to hold otherwise would trivialize the Fourteenth Amendment ...."(FN100) In other words, the Falvo court said it would refrain from policing school affairs when a constitutional right like the right to privacy lacked extensive supporting case law. However, the constitutional values at stake in Falvo were quite different than the First Amendment principles threatened by religion in the public school curriculum. Unlike the constitutional right to privacy, the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses have extensive supporting case law for their legal tests. So unlike the situation in Falvo, courts conceivably would only need to apply those doctrines in evaluating religious curricula, or adopt new tests that protect the values that the courts are concerned about.
The problem here is that courts cannot simply decline to get involved. They cannot ignore the constitutional values at stake. Many scholars agree, even some who identify problems with applying the traditional tests in this context. Even Professor McConnell, who dislikes the endorsement test, concedes that teachers could infringe their students' First Amendment rights if they teach religion in a substantively incorrect and unprofessional manner.(FN101) Professor Loewy too has argued that the endorsement test is the best tool to prevent the government from relegating members of minority religions to outsider status.(FN102)
Echoing Loewy's support of the endorsement test, Professor McCarthy applauds those courts that permit schools to edit student projects "to ensure that the school is not perceived as endorsing religious content ...."(FN103) Courts so far do intervene to prevent student religious expression from being misperceived as an endorsement of religion by the school.(FN104) However, McCarthy warns that the after-effects of cases like Rosenberger might remove the right of schools to edit student religious messages.(FN105) If the Court continues to prioritize free speech over the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses, McCarthy warns that the "proper place of religion in the instructional program" may be affected.(FN106)
Courts have also recognized the need to get involved in other areas of the curriculum despite a general reluctance to do so. Courts will get involved in non-religious choices in some cases when religion in the curriculum is not the issue. For example, in special education, courts gauge whether a school's curriculum for learning disabled children is 'appropriate.'(FN107)

The statute requires that the relevant authority ... first identify, then take steps to provide, an 'appropriate' education to LD children ... where the parents are otherwise dissatisfied with the district's decision, the statute provides a grievance procedure designed to resolve those difference. The right to judicial redress follows this grievance procedure .... Typically suits ... seek only declaratory or injunctive relief; in effect, they ask the court to second-guess the placement decision reached by school officials.(FN108)

In School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education, the Court demonstrated their willingness to evaluate classroom conduct in the name of federal law.(FN109) In Burlington, the parents of a learning-disabled first grade child disagreed with how their child's school proposed to educate him.(FN110) The district court ruled against the parents, explaining that based on the Court's evaluation of the school's proposed educational plan, the school was giving an appropriate education to the child.(FN111) The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also engaged in evaluating a school's curricular success in Strawn v. Board of Education.(FN112) In that case, the court held that based on its analysis, the school's educational plan for a deaf girl was 'wholly deficient' because it did not provide her with enough sign language training.(FN113)
Courts also will step into the shoes of school decision makers decisions in sexual harassment cases, even when the harassment occurs by someone other than the teacher. In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that a school district could be liable for sexual discrimination when it was aware that one of the school's male students was sexually harassing another, but did not try to stop the harassment from occurring.(FN114) The school's liability stemmed from sexual anti-discrimination laws under Title IX, which provides that "no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance...."(FN115) In rendering its opinion, the Court explained that normally it would not allow courts to interfere with how schools handle peer-on-peer sexual harassment.(FN116) However, the Court said it had to intervene in Davis since the gender-based harassment was severe enough to hinder the alleged victim's ability to receive an education and the school had deliberately neglected to stop the harassment.(FN117) In cases where a school is clearly indifferent to its duties, the Court said the school is liable for Title IX harassment violations because the school was clearly unreasonable by doing nothing.(FN118) The Court explained that using a 'clearly unreasonable' standard in gauging whether a school had fulfilled its Title IX duties was a way to balance federal obligations to uphold Title IX with a school's need to avoid excessive judicial interference.(FN119) Such a standard, contrary to what critics would say, would not clog up the courts with excessive cases, nor would it prevent schools from exercising local control.(FN120) In regards to court overflow, the Court said:

The recipient [of Title IX] funds must merely respond to known peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable. This is not a mere 'reasonableness' standard, as the dissent assumes .... In an appropriate case, there is no reason why courts, on a motion to dismiss, for summary judgment, or for a directed verdict, could not identify a response as not 'clearly unreasonable' as a matter of law.(FN121)

As for subjecting local school districts to federal court control, the Court responded:

School administrators will continue to enjoy the flexibility they require so long as funding recipients are deemed 'deliberately indifferent' to acts of student-on-student harassment only where the recipient's response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.(FN122)

Courts will also police classroom instruction if that instruction could be misconstrued as a school endorsement of a particular kind of student speech. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, high school journalism students wrote articles about teen pregnancy, which included interviews with several "anonymous" pregnant students at the school.(FN123) The students wanted to have the articles published in the student newspaper.(FN124) However, the principal refused to publish the articles because he thought that students would be able to identify the anonymous students and that the description of sexual activity would not be suitable reading material for the younger students.(FN125) The journalism students challenged the school's decision on free speech grounds, losing at the district level but winning at the appellate level.(FN126) The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that the school newspaper in Hazelwood was not a public forum, but merely a curricular outlet for the journalism class.(FN127) Journalism students wrote the paper during class hours, received credit and grades for their work and were subject to the editorial review of their journalism teacher.(FN128) Thus, the newspaper did not qualify as a public forum and the school could regulate it in a reasonable manner.(FN129) The Court found that the principal's decision in this case was reasonable. Specifically, the Court said that schools could exercise greater supervisory control over school-promoted speech like a newspaper to assure "that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school."(FN130)

In addition, a school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics, which might range from the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a high school setting. A school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy.(FN131)

However, despite judicial trepidation in approaching religion in the curriculum, some courts have addressed the issue. In Bethel School District v. Fraser, the Court held that the purpose of a public school is to prepare students for citizenship.(FN132) As part of this preparation, the Bethel Court said that public school pupils must be taught about the religions of their fellow citizens in an unbiased, truthful manner.(FN133) The point of public school, according to the Court, was to train students in a religiously harmonious, democratic political system.(FN134) The Supreme Court has also held that good governments have a compelling interest in avoiding religious divisiveness and that schools serve as vehicles for "inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."(FN135) Based on these holdings, it would not be unreasonable to expect courts to make sure that public school classrooms accurately teach about religion.
A basis for judicial policing of religious curriculum can also be derived from other cases. In Epperson v. Arkansas, the Court held that an Arkansas law that made teaching evolution in a public school a criminal offense violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.(FN136) Though the Court did not evaluate classroom curriculum or instruction, it did display disdain for laws that have the effect of tailoring curriculum to the preference of one religion.(FN137) In Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, a mother of a public school student tried to force her child's school to change the reading curriculum to make it more acceptable to her religion.(FN138) In ruling for the school, the Sixth Circuit refused to tailor the curriculum to her tastes, noting the many "pitfalls of trying to achieve a balance of materials concerning religion in a reading course ...."(FN139) Yet, in dicta the court did note that court regulation of curriculum is only forbidden if it has the effect or intent of advancing or inhibiting religion.(FN140) The Court did not forbid courtroom intervention to correct inaccurate teaching about religion. So it seems that courts have left the door open to intervene if the curriculum or method of instruction advances or inhibits religion through false information.(FN141)
Such constitutional principles are good reason for courts to police teaching about religion in the curriculum. But there are also good reasons for courts to not get involved: academic freedom, for one. The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized this issue in Hunter v. Board of Education:

Unlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace, classroom methodology affords no readily acceptable standards of care, or cause, or injury. The science of pedagogy itself is fraught with different and conflicting theories of how or what a child should be taught, and any layman might--and commonly does--have his own emphatic views on the subject.(FN142)

Plaintiffs who have tried to get courts to recognize the proposed tort of educational malpractice have failed.(FN143) Under an educational malpractice claim, a school would have a duty to educate its students and would be liable (negligent) in tort for failing to fulfill its duty.(FN144) Most cases involving educational malpractice deal with plaintiffs who allege that their school failed to teach them reading, or failed to properly diagnose a learning disability.(FN145) A smaller number of cases deal with claims when an "institution's negligence has injured a third party."(FN146) In Hunter, the parents of a 16-year-old public school student in Maryland sued the school district for negligently failing to diagnose their son's learning disability, which caused further academic problems later on in his schooling.(FN147) The Maryland court refused to recognize an educational negligence claim, because it "would in effect position the courts of this State as overseers of both the day-to-day operation of our educational process as well as the formulation if its governing policies ...."(FN148) The court did not want to place itself in that position.(FN149) However, the court did allow the parents to make an intentional tort claim against the school system, and remanded that claim to the district court for evaluation.(FN150) The Hunter case is not the only one in which courts have refused to recognize the tort of educational negligence/malpractice.(FN151) These courts criticize recognizing educational malpractice as a tort because it would flood the court system with all sorts of educational claims that are difficult for a court to measure.(FN152)
In a related case, the Supreme Court also refrained from interfering in the name of academic freedom. In Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico, public school students in New York challenged their school board's removal of several books from the school library on First Amendment grounds.(FN153) They claimed that the school board removed the books because board members disagreed with the values conveyed in the book, not because of educational reasons.(FN154) Though the Court agreed, it did so only because the library books were a voluntary supplement to a mandatory curriculum and thus enhanced a student's First Amendment rights to have access to controversial ideas in school.(FN155) The Court went out of its way to explain that its holding did not mean that the Court would act the same with mandatory school curriculum.

For as this case is presented to us, it does not involve textbooks, or indeed any books that Island Trees students would be required to read. Respondents do not seek in this Court to impose limitations upon their school Board's discretion to prescribe the curricula of the Island Trees schools. On the contrary, the only books at issue in this case are library books, books that by their nature are optional rather than required reading. Our adjudication of the present case thus does not intrude into the classroom, or into the compulsory courses taught there.(FN156)

In fact, the Court conceded that if Island Trees had dealt with mandatory school curriculum, the school district would probably have absolute discretion by "reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values ...."(FN157)
Thus legal scholars and courts have clearly shown that they are unable to solve the potential problems of religion in the public school curriculum. The Lemon, endorsement and coercion tests cannot always work because they will not prohibit good faith conduct that produces bad effects. Scholars see the problem with using those tests in this context, yet also see problems with ignoring the issue since constitutional principles are at stake. Courts are ignoring the issue, justifying their decisions based on concerns over academic freedom that they feel free to toss to the side in non-religious curricular matters. Is there a way that courts can protect the constitutional values in the classroom while preserving academic freedom at the same time? Only if courts devise a new test that balances these two issues.

IV. A PROPOSED NEW TEST FOR EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM
Courts have devised three legal standards that could be adapted to protect Establishment Clause values and academic freedom. Courts currently need to choose from three possible standards: 1) a good faith standard;(FN158) 2) a clearly unreasonable standard;(FN159) or 3) an objective observer standard.(FN160) Using too broad of a standard would probably give courts too much power in school decision-making, as well as clog up the courts with cases based on a wide array of alleged harms. Such intrusiveness would engender the same opposition as that of educational malpractice in tort.(FN161) An overly narrow standard might not sufficiently address the harm because it probably would not prevent a faulty curriculum from having an unconstitutional effect on its students. It is arguable that a clearly unreasonable standard best balances the competing concerns of constitutional principles and academic freedom.
Under a good faith standard, schools would more easily fulfill their constitutional duties. That is, if a school district has in good faith designed its curricula, approved its textbooks and trained its teachers with the purpose of presenting religions in a factually accurate and unbiased manner, then the school has met its constitutional duties. Only if the school has breached its duty of good faith, i.e. intentionally created a religious curriculum that was skewed against certain faiths, would the curriculum be unconstitutional. A good faith standard would exempt school leaders or a school district from responsibility for a renegade teacher who teaches in a biased manner or uses faulty curricular materials. However, if a school district creates a faulty religious curriculum in bad faith, the court would use the neutrality, endorsement and coercion tests to determine whether the academic program is unconstitutional.(FN162)
A perfect example of a good faith standard is Mozert, the case in which the mother of a public school student tried to force her child's school to make the reading curriculum more acceptable to her religion.(FN163) She claimed that the school's use of a certain textbook series violated the free exercise clause because the materials exposed her children to ideas that were contrary to her religion.(FN164) However, the appeals court held that since the school did not advocate one particular religion in the curriculum, nor did it advocate non-religion, the school created the curriculum in good faith and the reading curriculum could stand.(FN165) In explaining its holding, the Court warned against judicial interference that would ensue if anything but a good faith standard were used when courts evaluate school curricular decisions.(FN166)

Balance in the treatment of religion lies in the eye of the beholder. Efforts to achieve the particular 'balance' desired by any individual or group by the addition or deletion of religious materials would lead to a forbidden entanglement of the public schools in religious matters, if done with the purpose or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.(FN167)

Given that this Court and many others hesitate to second guess school curricula,(FN168) a good faith standard would arguably lessen the frequency of unwanted and ad hoc court interventions.
Other cases buttress an argument for a good faith standard. In Epperson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court invalidated Arkansas law that made teaching evolution in a public school a criminal offense.(FN169) The Court struck down the state statute because the law was purposely written in bad faith to favor Christians, violating the neutrality test.

Arkansas' law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality. Arkansas did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and universities all discussion of the origin of man. The law's effort was confined to an attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read.(FN170)

In Edwards v. Aguillard, the Supreme Court also held that a Louisiana law that forced science teachers to teach creationism if they taught Evolution was also made in bad faith.(FN171) In particular, the Court said that the

purpose of the Creationism Act was to restructure the science curriculum to conform with a particular religious viewpoint. Out of many possible science subjects taught in the public schools, the legislature chose to affect the teaching of the one scientific theory that historically has been opposed by certain religious sects.(FN172)

In other words, Mozert, Epperson and Edwards show that using a good faith standard to evaluate curricular constitutionality would discourage plaintiffs from bringing a legal claim absent proof that the school intended in bad faith to favor religion. Such a standard would prevent a plaintiff from saying that curricula that contradict or challenge the plaintiff's religious beliefs create a constitutional claim. Courts are not in the business of making all religions look good, or making all secular teaching comply with religious tenets.(FN173) Using a good faith standard in evaluating religious-oriented curricula avoids getting judges into the messy business of creating lesson plans that please all members of all religions, while at the same time prevents schools from intentionally violating First Amendment religious doctrines.
A stricter standard courts could use to enforce curricular constitutionality of religious content would be the clearly unreasonable standard that was used in the Davis case.(FN174) That is, a court would presume that a religious curriculum complies with the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses unless it would be clearly unreasonable for the school to expect that its behavior or curriculum was constitutional. A clearly unreasonable standard would have more 'bite' than a good faith standard because it would get beyond the intent of the school or the school's agent and would focus on the effect of the religious curriculum on its students. A court would only reverse the school's policy if the school had been clearly unreasonable in preventing a constitutional harm from occurring. For example, if a school unknowingly adopted a textbook that it later found out contained inaccurate and biased information about Islam and did nothing to stop teachers from using it or reinforcing those inaccuracies in the classroom, that would violate the clearly unreasonable standard.(FN175) A clearly unreasonable standard is less intrusive than a reasonableness standard, which might subject schools to too much judicial interference based on differing views of what a reasonably neutral curriculum should look like.(FN176)
An even stricter standard that courts could use to ensure curricular constitutionality is an objective observer standard from Lynch(FN177) and Santa Fe.(FN178) If an objective observer, acquainted with the history and environment surrounding the curriculum, perceives that an inaccurate curriculum coercively favors or endorses certain religions, the curriculum would be unconstitutional. An objective observer standard would make a school immediately responsible for the constitutional harm, regardless of good faith or of the absence of clearly unreasonable conduct. Such a standard would require greater judicial participation in curricular decisionmaking than the other two standards, but would provide a stronger protection against unintentional yet harmful violations of the religion clauses. Both a clearly unreasonable or objective observer standard would entail a far greater role in curricular decisionmaking for the courts than a good faith standard, and either would give courts veto power over how schools teach, albeit in limited circumstances.
Out of all these choices, the clearly unreasonable standard is the most effective tool for evaluating when curricula or instruction violates the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause. The good faith standard would not prevent enough harmful conduct from occurring. For example, a good faith standard would not prohibit a well-intentioned teacher from teaching in a lesson about the Crusades that all Muslims are warlike. The second option, an objective observer standard, would be completely unworkable in the real world. Under that standard, teachers would be punished for almost any classroom conduct that students could interpret as endorsing, coercing or favoring one religion over another. Teachers would have no way of predicting how their well-intentioned conduct would be perceived by their students. Without being able to predict, teachers would not be able to develop ways to prevent future problems. An objective observer standard would open teachers and schools to an avalanche of litigation. In response to fears of litigation, either schools would instruct teachers to avoid anything dealing with religion or teachers would refuse to teach the subject for fear of liability.
The clearly unreasonable standard is therefore the best way to preserve constitutional principles and academic freedom. Under a clearly unreasonable analysis, courts could prohibit unintentional classroom conduct that has the effect of threatening constitutional principles. This standard would bar only those activities in which it would be clearly unreasonable for one to think one had complied with the First Amendment. This standard would allow judges to avoid excessive interference in classroom instruction; thus avoiding the stigma of becoming policemen of politically correct behavior. For example, judges would not have to impose equal coverage rules under this standard in order to prevent government endorsement, favoritism or coercion. That is, judges would not have to force teachers to spend exactly the same amount of time on one religion as another in the name of preserving constitutional principles. Only clearly unreasonable coverage of one religion would qualify for judicial interference. The other benefit of a clearly unreasonable standard is that it allows courts to respond to good faith classroom conduct that crosses into impermissible conduct in a clearly articulated way. Take, for example, the math class where students are forced to chant to a square root 'god.' While it may be reasonable for a teacher to think that a group of high school seniors would understand that the activity was in jest, it could be clearly unreasonable for a teacher to make the same assumption in a class of first graders. In a world history class, it would be clearly unreasonable for a teacher to teach students that all Muslims are warlike and practice a less sophisticated religion than Christianity and Judaism.(FN179) This type of instruction is clearly unreasonable regardless of whether the teacher intended to favor one religion over another.
The point of the clearly unreasonable standard is that it cuts to the problematic conduct: curricula and instruction that endorse or favor religion, or activities that coerce students into religious practice. This standard does not protect the feelings of the overly sensitive plaintiffs or the politically correct. This standard address real constitutional concerns that the Supreme Court has said in any other outside-the-classroom context is prohibited. The First Amendment does forbid public schools from establishing religion and from interfering with students' free exercise of religion. Children are especially susceptible to outside influences and must be protected. If the Court accepts these principles outside the classroom, they should be applied inside the classroom as well. Concerns over academic freedom should not make public school classrooms safe havens for irresponsible and unconstitutional instruction. Using the clearly unreasonable standard would allow the court to walk this fine line while at the same time avoid excessive oversight.

V. CONCLUSION
Via the good faith, objective observer and clearly unreasonable tests, courts have the tools to determine whether a biased or incorrect curriculum threatens constitutional principles like the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses. The question is whether judges are willing to use those tools. To do so would raise all the concerns that commentators and judges suggest--the possibilities of overwhelming courts with religious curriculum cases, forcing schools to spend more money on litigation than on education, and moving courts down the slippery slope of recognizing educational malpractice as a tort. However, the greater question is whether religion as a curricular topic deserves the same special protections as curriculum in the special education, Title IX and student speech settings. In non-curricular situations, the Supreme Court has struck down government activities that unintentionally violate the religion clauses. To refrain from giving the same protections when religious principles are at issue in the curriculum seems to minimize the importance of the First Amendment. Regardless of intent, the government must remain neutral towards religion, it may not endorse religion, nor may it coerce others into or away from religious practices.(FN180) To apply these standards for every government activity except public school instruction and inside-the-classroom conduct would absolve schools of any constitutional liability for what they teach, even when it is blatantly wrong and prejudicial against certain religions. Courts should accept the constitutional obligation to make schools' curricula and behavior comply with the religion clauses and use a clearly unreasonable standard to do so. A good faith standard is insufficient because it only prohibits intended conduct. An objective observer test would flood schools with litigation, forcing religion to be taken out of the curriculum entirely. The clearly unreasonable test is best because it strikes the best balance between preventing unintentional conduct that produces bad effects and preserving academic freedom in the classroom. Courts will probably dislike having to take on the challenge of prohibiting clearly unreasonable religion in the public school curriculum. However, if public schools take on the task of teaching religion, courts must ensure that the schools do it in a way that complies with First Amendment principles.
ADDED MATERIAL
Elizabeth D. Kaiser has a B.A. in History from Duke University, a M.A. in Teaching Social Studies from Teachers College, Columbia University and a J.D. from Vanderbilt Law School.

FOOTNOTES

(Whereas in Lemon we had considered whether a statute (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an excessive entanglement between government and religion, in Agostini we modified Lemon for purposes of evaluating aid to schools and examined only the first and second factors. We acknowledged that our cases discussing excessive entanglement had applied many of the same considerations as had our cases discussing primary effect, and we therefore recast Lemon's entanglement inquiry as one criterion relevant to determining a statute's effect.).

The Mitchell plurality found that the religious schools only received government money if qualifying students attended that school. See id. Since parents and not the government decided where the students attended, the plurality found the government's program to be neutral towards religion. See id. at 831. "Private decisionmaking controls because of the per capita allocation scheme, and those decisions are independent because of the program's neutrality. It is the students and their parents--not the government--who, through their choice of school, determine who receives Chapter 2 funds. The aid follows the child." Id. Furthermore, the plurality found that since the criteria did not favor or disfavor religion then it gave recipients no incentive to adopt religion. See id. at 829 (a program is permissible only if it disperses money based on neutral, secular criteria that did not "favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis."). In Mitchell, the plurality found that the program was based on neutral criteria since aid was based on student enrollment, not on religion. See id. Thus, Mitchell allowed even more school programs to pass constitutional muster than would have been otherwise available under the old Lemon test.
In their concurrence, Justices O'Connor and Breyer harshly criticized the plurality's overreliance on neutrality in deciding whether there has been an impermissible effect of advancing religion. See id. at 839. "We have never held that a government-aid program passes constitutional muster solely because of the neutral criteria it employs as a basis for distributing aid," especially since the term 'neutrality' had been used differently for each case. Id. Instead of concluding that parental decisionmaking broke the link between religion and state and thus made the program neutral, Justices Breyer and O'Connor focused instead on the statutory language to show that student enrollment was the sole determinant of funding. Id. at 846, 842. The concurring justices concluded that the program's criteria were neutral, but for different reasons that of the majority for purposes of another method of analysis in Establishment Clause law, the endorsement test. "The distinction between a per-capita school-aid program and a true private-choice program is significant for purposes of endorsement .... In terms of public perception, a government program of direct aid to religious schools based on the number of students attending each school differs meaningfully from the government distributing aid directly to individual students who, in turn, decide to use the aid at the same religious schools." Id. If only enrollment determined funding levels, then religion was not a factor in the decision and thus the program did not have the effect of advancing religion. See id. In addition, the program was valid because it did not give aid recipients an incentive to adopt religion. See id. Thus, the aid complied with constitutional principles because it was only disbursed for secular purposes, did not "reach the coffers of a religious school" and only supplemented funds available to the religious school. Id. at 848-49. Essentially, the concurring justices found the plurality's definition of 'neutrality' to be an insufficient tool in evaluating whether the program impermissibly advanced religion. In addition, the concurrence reasoned that the Mitchell program was constitutional because it offered aid in the form of instructional materials and equipment instead of cash that could directly fund religion. Id. at 856. "If the mere ability of a teacher to devise a religious lesson involving the secular aid in question suffices to hold the provision of that aid unconstitutional, it is difficult to discern any limiting principle to the divertibility rule." Id. at 855.
The Court is still unable to agree on what types of school funding criteria are religiously neutral. In its most recent church and state case, a majority of justice again refused to adopt the doctrine that all government programs with neutral criteria are constitutional. At issue in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, was a school voucher program that a plurality held was constitutional because funds were dispursed according to neutral criteria. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644-45 (2002). Specifically, the city of Cleveland gave tuition money to poor families who lived in failing school districts. Id. The families could use that government tuition money to send their child to a religious school. Id. A group of Ohio taxpayers brought suit in district court claiming that the program violated the Establishment Clause. See id. The district court agreed, and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at 650. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, with Justice O'Connor casting the decisive vote in a concurring opinion. Id. As she had done in Mitchell, Justice O'Connor rejected using neutrality as a substitute for a full analysis of whether the direct aid to religious schools had the impermissible effect of advancing religion. Justice O'Connor concluded that aid here did not advance religion because it "was neither substantial nor atypical of existing government programs." Id. at 668.
After Lemon, Agostini and Mitchell, one would be hardpressed to predict what kinds of government programs complied with the Establishment Clause. The Agostini opinion highlighted the analytical gaps in Lemon, and expanded its application. The Mitchell plurality and concurrence pursued all loose ends left dangling in the Agostini opinion, and added a few more. The end result of these cases is that the Court has not provided a clear map of what is and what is not constitutional.

The Court has acknowledged that the 'fears and political problems' that gave rise to the Religion Clauses in the 18th century are of far less concern today. We are unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of Rome or other powerful religious leaders behind every public acknowledgement of the religious heritage long officially recognized by the three constitutional branches of government. Any notion that these symbols pose a real danger of establishment of a state church is farfetched indeed. Id.

The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited. To contact the publisher: http://www.iob.org/

ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the question of why the presentation of evolution in class frequently does not achieve acceptance of the evolutionary theory. In general, problems are twofold. Firstly, students may come to this particular topic with strong preconceptions, often based on specific religious teachings. Secondly, teachers may or may not bring an informed and/or dedicated approach to the teaching of evolution, relating to what they themselves were taught. Additional to our review of this topic and its problems, we suggest the use of a simple 'test' formulated, not on trying to impose knowledge and belief of evolution on the student, but on directing students towards the application of information on evolution to material already familiar to them. In this process, it is hoped that students will naturally incorporate at least some of the ideas of evolution into their own belief systems. Students are thus encouraged to assess or reassess evolution in terms of what they already consider to be true from their own experiences. Preliminary results (two trial runs) using this questionnaire indicate that students readily apply information with which they are familiar to Darwinian principles, and vice versa. These results, including verbal and written comments, also suggest that this 'test' may be meaningful as a first step towards acceptance of evolutionary theory. Teachers may find our questionnaire useful in determining a student's ability to understand evolutionary theory, and in exploring connections between understanding of and belief in evolution.
Key words: Belief system, Creationism, Darwin, Dogs, Evolution, Questionnaire.

INTRODUCTION
The theory of evolution is rightly identified with English naturalist, Charles Darwin (1859), although Darwin was not the first biologist to propose evolutionary theories (Lamarck, 1809). The 'evolution debate,' in fact, preceded both Darwin and Lamarck (Eiseley, 1958; Bowler, 1989). And, much has been added to the doctrine since Darwin's exposé, often under the label of 'Neo-Darwinism' (Minkoff, 1983). Although the group of postulates comprising this theory-complex is now much more expansive than set forth by Darwin, many people continue to use the expression 'Darwinism' synonymously with evolutionary theory. Indeed, the ideas and writings of Darwin still underpin this cluster of hypotheses, and Darwin's 'teachings' (or alleged teachings) continue to attract public attention, positive and negative, to evolution. As pointed out by Dennett (1995), 'almost no one is indifferent to Darwin.' Anti-Darwinian sentiments are expressed in current creationist writings (e.g. Creation Research Society, see Websites). Creationism, as a movement, is usually identified with the United States (Moore, 2000), although creationist beliefs are also common in other countries (e.g. Downie and Barron, 2000).
Questions arising from the pitting of evolutionary theory ('Darwinism') against creationism (or vice versa), as opposing explanations of the development of life on earth, are considered by some to have been answered before the close of the nineteenth century (Eldredge, 2001). The verdict among scientists, then and now, has gone in favour of evolution as a scientific explanation, since 'creationism' (even under the guise of 'creation science') is not science, but an extension of a fundamentalist religious belief. Part of the problem with the creationist approach has arisen from misuse of the Bible by some as a book of both religion and science, when the former is the main purpose for which it was intended (Moody, 1970). The 'science' of the Bible was cast in the context of the meagre scientific knowledge available in biblical times (Moody, 1970). The 'scientific' creationist's view (e.g. Morris and Whitcomb, 1961), which embellished upon geological theories of catastrophism (Price, 1926; Velikovsky, 1955), has little literal bearing on what actually took place during the earth's physical and biological history (Berra, 1990; Wise, 1998; Cherif et al., 2001; Eldredge, 2001). Wise (1998) illustrated how far short of the mark the creationist's timescale, is compared to the total geological history of the earth. Berra (1990) debunked a number of the better-known scientific creationist's arguments. Authors such as McMurtrie (2001) and Ruse (2001) have spent time recently weighing 'new' creationist's arguments (Johnson, 1993; Behe, 1996), which suggest that the concept of 'intelligent design' in the biological and biochemical world (and in the universe) should not be dismissed. Creationism indeed has a place in philosophy courses, examining a range of thought (including religion), but not in biology (or other science) courses. As Armstrong (1999) indicated, the 'pseudoscience' of creationism, unlike evolutionary theory, does not generate testable predictions in biological science.

THE PROBLEM OF ACCEPTANCE OF EVOLUTION
In spite of the unscientific nature of creation 'science,' and the overwhelming scientific evidence for evolution (Storer et al., 1979; Minkoff, 1983; Young, 1992; Minkoff and Baker, 2001; Zimmer, 2001; Raven and Johnson, 2002), the creationist viewpoint remains entrenched, especially in the United States (Moore, 2000). Support for this view may even be on the increase (Gallup, 1982, 1993; Sinclair and Pendarvis, 1998; Matthews, 2001; Moore, 2001). At a minimum, such a deep division has continued between some who do not believe the tenets of evolution, and some of those who do, that the possibility of achieving compromise (even in understanding) can seem, at times, hopeless. The disparity in belief of the two 'factions' is evident in the secondary school and university settings. A rigidity of belief by teenagers and young adults is often explainable in the context of social and religious up-bringing. Regardless of cause, this powerful chasm in belief has surfaced in various forums, including school boards (Goodman, 1999; Thomas 2000), professional societies (Hull, 1988), and a number of court cases in the US (see partial listing in Eldredge, 2001). Some states, in statements of science standards, do not require use of the word 'evolution' in teaching biology courses (Moore, 2001). Certain other states present disclaimers in state-used biology texts to the effect that evolution is 'just a theory' (Goodman, 1999; Moore, 2002), implying that other interpretations of life's development on earth are just as plausible.
To regard evolution as 'just a theory' shows a misunderstanding of the nature of a scientific theory. An established scientific theory is not just an 'idea,' 'guess' (Sinclair and Pendarvis, 1998), or simple hypothesis, as is often in popular vernacular equated with 'theory.' Darwin's theory is a major construct, a multiple structure composed of related postulates -- resource limitation, struggle for existence, variation, adaptation, fitness, natural selection, branching descent, origin of species, extinction, etc. (Storer et al., 1979; Minkoff, 1983; Raven and Johnson, 2002) -- these postulates have not been substantively contradicted by fact (Minkoff and Baker, 2001), i.e. have not been credibly falsified. This is in contrast to explanations that are scientifically unstable, simpler and largely mythological in content (e.g. 'scientific creationism'), and which are readily exposed by the science philosopher's criterion of falsification (Popper, 1962; Smith, 1998). The theory of evolution is sufficiently bolstered such that it is composed of well-documented sub-theories (Morris, 2001). One such, natural selection (the cornerstone of Darwinian theory), is itself divided by some authors (e.g. Ehrlich and Holm, 1963) into scientifically demonstrated subcategories (namely directional, stabilising, and disruptive selection). Evolutionary theory is no 'house of cards'; it is built of sturdy parts, and will not fall (regardless of opinion). Evolution (in its entirety) continues to be considered 'a theory' because there are many components to it, and some details are being worked out, and information added. The mega-theory of evolution should be viewed as valid but 'unfinished' (Ayala, 1998), a 'work in progress.' As a well-founded complex of propositions, such a theory should be allowed growth and adjustment over time (Hodson, 1991).
With the advent of 'Neo-Darwinism' (see discussion in Minkoff, 1983; Ruse, 1988), i.e. what some have termed the 'evolutionary' or 'modern' synthesis (Dobzhansky, 1937; Huxley, 1942; Mayr and Provine, 1998; Zimmer, 2001), has come new information about evolution (as from study of molecular evolution, e.g. Li and Graur, 1991). The 'gradualistic' evolutionary theory of Darwin, based on long-range action of environmental selection upon variation, is still the foundation of evolution. As stated by Lennox (1992), 'the principle of natural selection remains the essential core of evolutionary explanation'. However, added to Darwinism have been such significant evolutionary (not necessarily Darwinian) phenomena as punctuated equilibrium and saltatory speciation (Eldredge and Gould, 1972; Dennett, 1995; Eldredge, 1999); cytocatalytic evolution in plants (Lewis, 1967); and, evolution through cellular, endosymbiotic events (Margulis, 1993; Blackwell and Powell, 1995). Evolutionary theory has been, although controversially, extended to 'sociobiology' (Hull, 1988; Sober, 2000; Wilson, 2000).
To regard the theory of evolution as 'just a theory' also fails to address the fact that this complex concept has been more influential in organising biological information and thought than any other theory (Minkoff and Baker, 2001). Evolution is of such significance as to be considered 'the most powerful theory within the field of biology' (Rutledge and Warden, 2000). It is imperative to scientific literacy that the best factual and theoretical information available is presented, including the relevance of the topic of evolution to explanation of the diversity of life (AAAS Project 2061, 1993). The National Academy of Sciences, USA (1998) encouraged teachers 'to use evolution as the organising theme in teaching biology' (Alles, 2001). The National Research Council (1996), under 'unifying concepts and processes,' emphasised the importance of evolutionary theory in explaining both form and function of organisms. A strong statement endorsing the teaching of evolution was issued in 1997 by the National Association of Biology Teachers (NABT); see Websites. Nonetheless, a text deficiency (in the US) in the use of evolution as an organising principle has been identified (Bradley, 2001), although the extent to which this is true has been challenged (Flammer, 2001). Some secondary school biology teachers, despite court rulings to the contrary, continue to teach creationism (Moore, 2002).

WHY DO WE HAVE A PROBLEM OF ACCEPTANCE OF EVOLUTION?
What is it about evolutionary theory that makes it such a sensitive issue compared with other scientific theories, e.g. atomic theory, quantum theory, cell theory? The answer often relates to a literal acceptance of the creation account set forth in the Bible's Old Testament book of Genesis, and to the fact that this acceptance runs to the core of a person's religious belief system (involving perceptions and fears concerning morality, human behaviour in general, views of 'man' in God's image, and mortality and hope of salvation). Some religious conservatives associated with the creationist movement entertain the spurious notion that the teaching of evolution is somehow associated with a decline of moral values in society (Eger, 1991). Philosophers, however, have not necessarily considered the study of evolution inimical to idealism (Royce, 1892; White, 1972). A proper understanding of evolution (including appreciation of the potential value of every species in the environment) should, to the contrary, enhance ethical purposes. Dobzhansky (1973) noted a less noble, more political motive lurking amid the creation movement that, 'some people fear enlightenment, because enlightenment threatens their vested interests,' a point that we commend to further thought but not to further explanation here. Whatever the reason, or agenda, of people associated with the creationist movement, surely by now the vast majority of people understand, with all the knowledge and public education available on, for example, biology, molecular genetics, ecology, stratigraphy and paleontology, that evolution (or something like it) must have occurred, and that the earth is so very much older than, say, 6000 - 10 000 years (Wise, 1998). Well, perhaps, or perhaps not! Moore (2001) cited references to indicate that possibly half of all Americans above the age of 18 reject evolution as a valid concept.
Many factors contribute to a lack of student (and public) understanding, and acceptance, of evolution. One factor, not apparent at first, has been that we who are (or have been) college professors have not in some cases played the role that we should have in promoting the significance of evolution in science (National Center for Science Education, '25 ways to promote science education,' see Websites; National Research Council, 1996; Aguillard, 1999; and Eldredge, 2001). A connection between college teachers and high school students is usually an indirect one; we usually don't teach these students directly, as this is generally the provenance of secondary school teachers. It is certainly true that complacency exists among some college professors of biology in the way they present (or don't present) information on evolution in their classes. And, these classes often contain high numbers of schoolteachers and/or students studying to be teachers. Since professors teach the secondary school teachers, whatever happens (or fails to happen) in the college classroom stands a good chance of being translated to the high school setting. We, as college and university teachers, in many cases have apparently failed to keep carrying forward the torch of evolution. In example, Moore (2002) discussed the point that high school teachers in certain states (e.g. Louisiana) don't recall hearing the word evolution in college biology courses. A significant percentage of teachers in various states still support the teaching of creationism (Moore, 2001). Related to such points, Berra (1990) had earlier discussed a potentially significant problem in the training of high school teachers, particularly in understanding the basic facts and ideas of evolution. Recent surveys of Indiana high school biology teachers (Rutledge and Warden, 2000; Rutledge and Mitchell, 2002) indicated that a majority had not received any special training in evolution; a smaller but significant percentage had a problem with the acceptance of evolution, and an associated problem of proper understanding of the content of evolutionary theory. The AAAS Project 2061 (1998) stated that teaching content (scientific knowledge and subject matter), not just general or generic teaching competency, needs greater attention; and that science (and science education) majors in college 'often have serious deficiencies in fundamental ideas of science' (such ideas of course would include the theory of evolution). One conclusion of Project 2061 is that university professors in general (not just professors of education) need to become more involved in teacher preparation.
The sense of indifference (in universities and elsewhere) toward presenting evidence for evolution has been around for a while. The renowned naturalist and evolutionist, Marston Bates, stated 'I think there is little need to review again the evidence that life as we see it is the result of some evolutionary process' (Bates, 1950). It is probable, however, that scientists often have not been perceived by others to have such a laissez faire attitude towards disseminating information on evolution. There have, in fact, been those who asserted that scientists and teachers of science were much too dogmatic and authoritarian in presenting material on and imposing their views of evolution (e.g. Gish, 1973). Inadequate transmission of information on evolution that has often occurred in the college and university classroom does not, however, support such an assertion. Why does this 'complacency' in the teaching of evolution in colleges and universities exist? Perhaps the explanation, at least in the US, is as follows: Along with being 'liberated' by the US Supreme Court in 1987, during the case of Edwards v Aguillard (Aguillard, 1999), to teach evolution unencumbered by any mandate to present a counter viewpoint (i.e. 'creation science'), has come a certain insouciance. In discussions with some professors, this apparent apathy seems to involve a perception that the evolution battle has already been won, and/or a view that it is not worth stirring up trouble in class with such a controversial topic (see also Moore, 2001). In either case, a number of professors often teach facts relating to evolution, such as morphological relationships of one animal phylum to another, without actually using the term 'evolution' (McMurtrie, 2001), and without making it clear that the principles of evolution underlie such teachings. We have heard statements to the effect of, 'biology is biology, with or without evolution; so, why set yourself up for abuse by trying to seriously present evolution in class to students with varied backgrounds and beliefs?'. To this point we emphatically state that biology is definitely not just biology without evolutionary theory. To strip biological instruction of evolution is to excise its central, unifying theme (Minkoff and Baker, 2001). It is (for us) hard to imagine presenting a course on animal diversity (covering the various phyla) without strongly invoking evolutionary relationships, and making it clear that phylogeny is being discussed. Dobzhansky (1973) stated that, 'nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.' Though overstated (see Sober, 2000), Dobzhansky's point is nonetheless a good one. Without evolutionary theory, biology is divested of needed theme, coherence, understanding, and interpretation of relationship.

HOW MIGHT WE SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF ACCEPTANCE OF EVOLUTION?
There are no definite answers here. As Moore (2002) discussed, simply upgrading statements regarding evolution in state teaching standards is not by itself enough. Given the meagre success that the teaching of evolution has apparently had (Aguillard, 1999; Moore, 2001), a renewed effort is in order. If we, as teachers, have often not been convincing with our teaching of evolution, what approach might improve the situation? One approach would be to further investigate the 'why' or 'belief' questions (Mayr, 1961; Shellberg, 2001), in addition to the 'what' and 'how,' i.e. purely fact-based, information. In other words, the problem could be approached in terms of belief acquisition (Bird, 1998) or, as we might suggest, belief expansion. We need to develop the initial experience of the teaching of evolution for students in such a way that they can readily identify with and incorporate this information, not only in terms of what they have previously been taught, but with what they already believe or are prepared to believe.
Understanding and belief are, of course, not the same thing (Singer, 1999). A person may understand a topic (evolution, for example) without significant incorporation into his/her belief. We need therefore to bring the two mental processes together in the classroom. Downie and Barron (2000) noted the connection between belief and the learning and acceptance of information. Belief can be so powerful that it modifies perception of objective phenomena (Kordig, 1971). If we can thus, somehow, intercalate ideas of evolution naturally into the student's own belief system, we will stand a better chance of gaining student appreciation, and eventual acceptance, of evolutionary theory. To be effective, this should be done simply, clearly, and without perceived threat to belief (to prevent immediate dismissal by the student). Matthews (2001) advocated the use of 'creation stories,' in teaching evolution, as a means of altering student attitudes favourably towards evolutionary theory. However, the approach of Matthews, though interesting, is controversial, and has received mixed reviews (Hazard, 2001; Munger, 2001). It is not clear that the statistics cited by Matthews (pre-test versus two post-test calculations) documented a substantial change in student attitude. It is our view that a significant change in acceptance, in the case of something as potentially emotionally deep-seated as the topic of evolution, is probably not reliably measured in a short time frame (e.g. during a course); this view would appear to be supported by studies such as those of Sinclair and Pendarvis (1998). Rather, it would seem reasonable to attempt to develop ideas (some already in the minds of students) that could result in a more 'internalised' understanding of evolution. It is, we believe, a personalised understanding of the theory of evolution that is most likely to lead to long-term acceptance, i.e. as the student might continue to think about this theory over the years.
Winterer (2001) presented a lab exercise for the purpose of 'explaining Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and evolution effectively'. While Winterer's proposal is useful for understanding the Hardy-Weinberg gene frequency (change) equation (using, necessarily, a very limited number of alleles), it is doubtful that this exercise would result in a broad-based comprehension of evolution. A study by Sinclair and Pendarvis (1998) indicated that students were less impressed (in considerations of evolution) with molecular and genetic data than with material, e.g. fossils, they could readily observe directly. Also, unexpected (perhaps environmental) changes in genotypic composition of small animal or plant populations ('genetic drift') can void predictions based on Hardy-Weinberg equilibria (Ehrlich and Holm, 1963). As indicated by Gould (1982), environmental selection acts on genotypes, usually indirectly, through phenotypes. Phenotypes usually occur as members of populations or species (Barton and Partridge, 2000), and are the product of many genes, gene recombinations and interactions, occasional mutations, and the complexities of ontogenetic development. The Mendelian model of heredity (involving but a few gene pairs) is stochastic (probabilistic), i.e. without precisely predetermined outcomes (Giere, 1984). Models of evolution, as a whole, involving many (and many kinds of) factors, and the entire organism, would be yet more stochastic. A holistic approach (based on experience) perhaps offers the best opportunity for most people to relate initially to the topic of evolution.
We propose, as an introduction to evolution for students in introductory biology (college or secondary school), a brief 'evolution test' (not necessarily divulged as such to students). The purpose of this questionnaire is to initiate a personally meaningful consideration of evolution, and to augment a student's existing belief system concerning biological science. This 'test' can be, as we present, a limited series of 'objective' questions about particular life experiences. These questions are best posed such that they are of interest to students, and non-threatening to their beliefs. The questions should not have 'correct' answers (as in Rutledge and Warden, 2000), but should ask what the students think or believe about a given question. Musante (1999) raised the point that evolutionary theory (being factually based) is not something to 'believe,' but should simply be understood as good science (the best scientific explanation of life's diversity). We agree. However, evolution unfortunately remains a topic that will often require penetration into an individual's belief system prior to acceptance. Cherif et al. (2001) distinguished, in class exercises, between 'I believe' and 'I think' responses to questions. Though a valid distinction, nuances of meaning seem better left to more advanced considerations of evolution.
The 'evolution test' (see Appendix) should be clear, user-friendly and formulated on information to which the students can relate, and even enjoy. Marbach-Ad (2001) indicated that students most readily relate to material at a level familiar to them. Bischoff and Anderson (2001) stated that, 'constructivist theory of teaching and learning emphasises the significance of the individual learner's previous knowledge'. Bradley (2001) suggested the efficacy of connecting the topic of evolution to 'everyday observations'. Most students have experience with and fondness for dogs and breeds of dogs. For this reason, and because discussion of evolution of dogs and dog breeds is available in popular books (e.g. Caras, 1996), articles (e.g. Lange, 2002) and in biology texts (e.g. Raven and Johnson, 2002), we developed a questionnaire based mainly on differences among dogs. Each question is intended to ask, 'What do you believe in this case?' In part C, the student is encouraged to apply questions from the 'canine test' (part A) to principles of evolutionary theory (part B). Interpretation of responses, in light of information on evolution, can be discussed with students as appropriate. The extent to which the answering of parts A and C influences the answering of part D may be of particular interest.

RESULTS
For the purposes of this study, the questionnaire was completed by 74 General Studies (Freshman Seminar) students and 51 General Biology students, Academic Year 2001 - 2002, at the University of Alabama. The number of responses per question varied from 64 to 74 in the General Studies group (see Table 1) and from 48 to 51 in the General Biology group (see Table 2).
The outcome of the 'test taking' in these two groups of students was quite similar. This was somewhat surprising, given a slight difference in clientele, e.g. there were fewer freshmen and more biology majors in General Biology than in the General Studies Seminar. Since quite similar percentage totals on key questions (e.g. questions 21, 24 - 25) were obtained in the two classes, these classes may be discussed together. In both of these sample runs, a strong connection is evident between the perception of content of the canine test, Part A, questions 1 - 10 (information dealing with dog breeds and related matters), and part B, principles of evolution. This is reflected in the answers for part C (questions 11 - 20), in which information sets from parts A and B were mutually applied. The overwhelming majority of students in both classes selected appropriate answers in part C--although students were asked to select just one answer for each of questions 11 - 20, more than one applicable answer was, of course, often possible. Thus, most students were able to effectively apply information with which they were familiar, or at least with which they gained familiarity during the exam, to the thought questions posed concerning evolution. This ability to understand connections and to apply information concerning evolution is also evident in the answering of question 21 (part D). If we combine answers a and b for question 21, i.e. those students perceiving several connections between the canine test and principles of evolution, the total from General Studies Seminar is 92.2 %, and from General Biology is 93.8 %.
The ability to comprehend and apply evolutionary information was not, however, mirrored by a similar degree of personal acceptance of evolution; one need only look at the answers to questions 23 and 24 to realise this. The percentages of students answering 23a (considering evolution the primary basis for the progression of life on earth) were respectively, in General Studies Seminar and General Biology, 34.4% and 35.4%. The respective percentages for 24a (considering evolution compatible with belief system) were 26.6% and 29.2%. There is, thus, an obvious gap between understanding and application of information on evolution (21), and a strong acceptance of evolution (23, 24). This outcome is consistent with other studies in which students, who did not necessarily believe in evolution, could nonetheless pass exams on evolution (McKeachie et al., 2002; the sample size of McKeachie et al., however, was small, the conclusions being based mainly on three 'creationist' students who remained in a community college biology class in which evolution was taught). The hope of biology teachers interested in promoting knowledge of evolution is that, regardless of initial negative student views of evolution, there is the possibility that acceptance may develop in the future. We believe that our study addresses this issue.
Our test results illustrate two main points. First, the ability to successfully answer part C, and to perceive connections, D (question 21), in our test shows an understanding of principles of evolution. Second, if all percentages for answers in questions 22 - 25 are considered, most students, though cautious, could be interpreted to have at least a degree of openness to the topic of the theory of evolution (supported also by student comments). Only 9.4% and 6.3% respectively in the two classes indicated that they could never believe in evolution (24e). It can therefore be deduced that a willingness to at least consider the theory of evolution as having some sort of validity was found in this study to be at the 90% level or greater. It would appear feasible that a measure of acceptance of evolution (or even total acceptance), if not present already, could develop over time in the minds of a substantial majority of students. These results should, we believe, be encouraging to teachers of biology. It then becomes a matter of fostering continued considerations of evolution in later courses, or perhaps in future continuing education formats.

CONCLUSION
When anyone, scientist or non-scientist, approaches matters of science, their approach is in the context of pre-existing mental constructs, i.e. an individual's philosophical background and assumptions (Kantor, 1953). One goal of any biology teacher should be to attempt to infuse, into existing backgrounds, an understanding of and openness to consider evolutionary theory. The expression 'evolution' has multiple meanings (LaBar, 1999). Evolution is defined in Webster's International Unabridged Dictionary as: 'A series of related changes in a certain direction: process of change: organic development.' As stated by Sober (2000), 'evolution means change.' Extrapolating from Sober, if one believes in change (in almost anything), and a certain process of change, then he/she believes, to an extent, in evolution. However, this definition of evolution is, of course, far too simplistic for a proper appreciation of the complexity of biological evolution, in which new biological forms can make their appearance. Nonetheless, it illustrates that an 'acceptance' of evolution can exist at different levels or in different degrees.
It is of course the question of the origin of humans that is the source of the most conflict when considering evolution. Related to this conflict is the vanity of the conception that we are somehow God-like, or closer to God than other animals, i.e. that we humans are 'special creations.' As has been discussed, it is this creationist view that has played most emotionally against a naturalistic origin of humans through evolution, in which the invocation of deities is not necessary. As Ehrlich and Holm (1963) pointed out, one of the problems associated with attempted objective considerations of evolutionary theory is the strong anthropocentric bias often present in such discussions. A further complication in casting human origin into initial discussions of evolution is that human biological evolution follows the Darwinian paradigm, but human cultural evolution (including the development of science and technology) is more Lamarckian in character (Fetzer, 1993). Darwin, however, in his Origin of Species (1859) had, intentionally, essentially nothing to say about the origin of humans. T H Huxley added information on human paleontology and evolution in 1863. After Huxley paved the way towards acceptance of human evolution -- a path involving a common ancestry with the great apes -- Darwin (1871) eventually wrote about 'man's' place in nature (see Young, 1992). Thus, what one believes about the appearance of humans on earth (whether by evolution or through Adam and Eve) is not necessarily at stake in accepting basic Darwinian principles (as set forth in 1859, and as listed in the questionnaire, Part B). As indicated by Sinclair and Pendarvis (1998), it is important for teachers to consider an approach to evolution that does not require students in their perceptions to make a choice between acceptance of this theory and their religious beliefs.
A cogent point made by van Fraassen (1979) is that one may 'accept' (in terms of cold logic) a theory as 'empirically adequate' (as fitting the facts) without necessarily jeopardising one's particular belief system (see also Fetzer, 1993). The pragmatist, and instrumentalist, philosophers (and educators), James (1907) and Dewey (1910), utilised a practical approach to theories, laws, and the search for 'truth.' Their utilitarian outlook permitted acceptance of the theory of evolution as true (and significant to philosophy) simply because 'it worked' (fit the data and had explanatory power). James and Dewey viewed the theory of evolution as an instrument, intellectually solvable to real world situations and observations (including flux or change). The purpose of a theory, thus, can be regarded as no more than that of offering an explanation to a set of phenomena (Hodson, 1991). Warburton (1999) astutely observed that it is in fact the process of evolution that has led the development of the human brain to the capability of making successful inductive generalisations, such as the theory of evolution.
In addition to the different ways in which one may relate to evolutionary theory, it should also be noted that acceptance of a part of evolutionary theory is possible, even reasonable, without acceptance of the entire doctrine. As Downie and Barron (2000) discussed, some students seemed to have little or no problem with evolution as a viable process operating within species (microevolution). However, students often did have a problem when it came to the evolution of species or larger groups (macroevolution). And, of course, the evolution of humans, in particular, is often a sticking point. However, it is quite feasible, as mentioned, to accept evolutionary theory, with or without discussion of events in the evolution of Homo sapiens, although a degree of completeness would obviously be lacking. It is our opinion that any measure of acceptance of evolutionary theory, or acceptance of any part of it (see part D of the questionnaire, questions 22 - 25), by a student formerly hostile to or distrustful of the topic, would represent meaningful progress as regards the student's future openness to considerations of thematic biology, and evolution in particular. As indicated by Quine (1961), modifications in acceptance of facts or theories may require only a minor adjustment in a person's belief system.
ADDED MATERIAL
Will H Blackwell[sup1], Martha J Powell[sup1] and George H Dukes[sup2]
Department of Biological Sciences, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama[sup1] and Department of Biology, Millsaps College, Jackson, Mississippi[sup2], USA
Professor Will H Blackwell (corresponding author) is Adjunct Professor at the Department of Biological Sciences, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, USA. Tel: (205) 750 2098; Fax: (205) 348 1786; Email: W60bubba@aol.com. Professor Martha J Powell is Chair also in the Department of Biological Sciences at The University of Alabama. George H Dukes is retired Professor, Department of Biology, Millsaps College, Jackson, Mississippi, USA.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We wish to thank Dr Sarah L McGuire, Department of Biology, Millsaps College, Jackson, Mississippi, USA, for assistance with some of the literature cited in paper.
Table 1 Results of the questionnaire (see Appendix), taken by General Studies (Freshman Seminar), AY 2001-2002, The University of Alabama, 74 student respondents; The number of responses per question ranged from 64 to 74. Percentages by answer given.

1.   (a) 93.2%      2.   (a) 87.8%      3.   (a) 94.6%      4.   (a) 0%         5.   (a) 94.6%
     (b)  2.7%           (b) 10.8%           (b)  1.4%           (b) 89.2%           (b)  5.4%
     (c)  4.1%           (c)  1.4%           (c)  4.1%           (c) 10.8%           (c)  0.0%
6.   (a) 82.4%      7.   (a) 63.5%      8.   (a) 93.2%      9.   (a) 95.9%      10.  (a) 85.1%
     (b)  6.8%           (b) 24.3%           (b)  0.0%           (b)  1.4%           (b)  4.1%
     (c) 10.8%           (c) 12.2%           (c)  6.8%           (c)  2.7%           (c) 10.8%
11.  (1) 97.3%      12.  (3) 58.9%      13.  (2)  6.8%      14.  (2) 91.8%      15.  (3)  1.4%
     (2)  2.7%           (4)  6.8%           (3)  1.4%           (6)  1.4%           (4)  6.9%
                         (5)  8.2%           (7)  1.4%           (8)  2.7%           (5) 54.2%
                         (6) 11.0%           (8) 76.7%           (9)  2.7%           (6)  4.2%
                         (7) 12.3%           (9)  9.6%          (10)  1.4%           (7)  4.2%
                        (10)  2.7%          (10)  4.1%                               (8)  1.4%
                                                                                     (9)  4.2%
                                                                                    (10) 23.6%
16.  (3)  1.4%      17.  (1)  1.4%      18.  (2)  1.4%      19.  (3) 15.1%      20.  (3)  5.5%
     (4)  4.2%           (3)  2.7%           (3)  5.5%           (4)  8.2%           (4) 49.3%
     (5)  2.8%           (4) 15.1%           (4)  4.1%           (5)  6.8%           (5)  8.2%
     (6)  1.4%           (5) 12.3%           (5) 15.1%           (6) 30.1%           (6)  1.4%
     (7)  1.4%           (6) 16.4%           (6) 45.2%           (7) 21.9%           (7) 31.5%
     (8) 25.0%           (7)  9.6%           (7)  6.8%           (8)  1.4%          (10)  4.1%
     (9) 58.3%           (8)  2.7%           (8)  2.7%          (10) 16.4%
    (10)  5.6%           (9) 34.2%           (9)  9.6%
                        (10)  5.5%          (10)  9.6%
21.  (a) 71.9%      22.  (a) 40.6%      23.  (a) 34.4%      24.  (a) 26.6%      25.  (a)  9.4%
     (b) 20.3%           (b) 17.2%           (b) 29.7%           (b) 21.9%           (b) 32.8%
     (c)  1.6%           (c)  0.0%           (c)  9.4%           (c) 28.1%           (c) 21.9%
     (d)  6.2%           (d) 39.1%           (d) 14.1%           (d) 14.1%           (d) 25.0%
     (e)  0.0%           (e)  3.1%           (e) 12.5%           (e)  9.4%           (e) 10.9%

Table 2 Results from taking the questionnaire (see Appendix) in General Biology, The University of Alabama, AY 2001-2002; 51 student respondents; responses per question varied from 48 to 51. Percentages by answer.

1.   (a) 80.4%      2.   (a) 88.2%      3.   (a) 98.0%      4.   (a)  0.0%      5.   (a)100.0%
     (b)  7.8%           (b) 11.8%           (b)  2.0%           (b) 90.2%           (b)  0.0%
     (c) 11.8%           (c)  0.0%           (c)  0.0%           (c)  9.8%           (c)  0.0%
6.   (a) 80.4%      7.   (a) 78.4%      8.   (a) 94.1%      9.   (a) 98.0%      10.  (a) 82.4%
     (b)  7.8%           (b) 11.8%           (b)  2.0%           (b)  0.0%           (b)  3.9%
     (c) 11.8%           (c)  9.8%           (c)  3.9%           (c)  2.0%           (c) 13.7%
11.  (1) 98.0%      12.  (3) 66.7%      13.  (1)  2.0%      14.  (2) 88.2%      15.  (3)  5.9%
     (2)  2.0%           (4)  2.0%           (2)  3.9%           (8)  3.9%           (4)  2.0%
                         (5) 13.7%           (8) 84.3%           (9)  7.8%           (5) 70.6%
                         (6)  5.9%           (9)  5.9%                               (6)  3.9%
                         (7) 11.8%          (10)  3.9%                               (7)  3.9%
                                                                                     (9)  3.9%
                                                                                    (10)  9.8%
16.  (4)  3.9%      17.  (1)  2.0%      18.  (3)  4.0%      19.  (3)  6.0%      20.  (4) 52.9%
     (5)  3.9%           (3)  7.8%           (4)  2.0%           (4)  8.0%           (5)  5.9%
     (8) 11.8%           (4) 13.7%           (6) 58.0%           (5)  8.0%           (6)  5.9%
     (9) 76.5%           (5)  7.8%           (7)  4.0%           (6) 22.0%           (7) 31.4%
    (10)  3.9%           (6) 15.7%           (8)  2.0%           (7) 24.0%           (9)  2.0%
                         (7) 23.5%           (9) 12.0%           (9)  6.0%          (10)  2.0%
                         (8)  5.9%          (10) 18.0%          (10) 26.0%
                         (9) 15.7%
                        (10)  7.8%
21.  (a) 81.3%      22.  (a) 62.5%      23.  (a) 35.4%      24.  (a) 29.2%      25.  (a) 14.6%
     (b) 12.5%           (b)  6.3%           (b) 29.2%           (b) 12.5%           (b) 29.2%
     (c)  0.0%           (c)  0.0%           (c)  6.3%           (c) 41.7%           (c) 45.8%
     (d)  4.2%           (d) 27.1%           (d)  6.3%           (d) 10.4%           (d) 10.4%
     (e)  2.1%           (e)  4.2%           (e) 22.9%           (e)  6.3%           (e)  0.0%

REFERENCES
AAAS Project 2061 (1993) Benchmarks for science literacy. New York, USA and London, UK: Oxford University Press.
AAAS Project 2061 (1998) Blueprints for reform: science, mathematics, and technology education. New York, USA and London, UK: Oxford University Press.
Aguillard D (1999) Evolution education in Louisiana public schools: a decade following. Edwards v Aguillard. The American Biology Teacher, 61, 182 - 188.
Alles D L (2001) Using evolution as the framework for teaching biology. The American Biology Teacher, 63, 20 - 23.
Armstrong J E (1999) Misunderstanding exists in science. The American Biology Teacher, 61, 412.
Ayala F J (1998) Beyond Darwinism? The challenge of macroevolution to the synthetic theory of evolution. In Philosophy of biology, ed. Ruse M, pp. 118-133. Amherst, New York, USA: Prometheus Books (initially published in Philosophy of Science Association, 2, 1983).
Barton N and Partridge L (2000) Limits to natural selection. BioEssays, 22, 1075 - 1084.
Bates M (1950) The nature of natural history. Schribner's. (Reprinted: 1990, New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press).
Behe M J (1996) Darwin's black box: the biochemical challenge to evolution. New York, USA: A Touchstone Book (Simon & Schuster).
Berra T M (1990) Evolution and the myth of creationism: a basic guide to the facts in the evolution debate. Stanford, California, USA: Stanford University Press.
Blackwell W and Powell M (1995) Where have all the algae gone, or how many kingdoms are there? The American Biology Teacher, 57, 160 - 167.
Bird A (1998) Philosophy of science. Montreal & Kingston, CAN: McGill Queen's University Press.
Bischoff P J and Anderson O R (2001) Development of knowledge frameworks and higher order cognitive operations among secondary school students who studied a unit on ecology. Journal of Biological Education, 35, 81 - 88.
Bowler P J (1989) Evolution: the history of an idea. (Revised edition). Berkeley, California, USA: University of California Press.
Bradley J V (2001) Evolutionary model can represent the culture of biology. The American Biology Teacher, 63, 394.
Caras R A (1996) A perfect harmony: the intertwining lives of animals and humans throughout history. New York, USA: Simon & Schuster.
Cherif A, Adams G, and Loehr J (2001) What on 'earth' is evolution?: the geological perspective of teaching evolutionary biology effectively. The American Biology Teacher, 63, 569 - 591.
Darwin C R (1859) On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life. London, UK: John Murray.
Darwin C R (1871) The descent of man and selection in relation to sex. London, UK: Murray.
Dennett D C (1995) Darwin's dangerous idea: evolution and the meaning of life. New York, USA: Touchstone Books.
Dewey J (1910) The influence of Darwin on philosophy, and other essays. New York, USA: Holt. (reprinted in 1977 by Prometheus Books, New York)
Dobzhansky T (1937) Genetics and the origin of species. New York, USA: Columbia University Press.
Dobzhansky T (1973) Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. The American Biology Teacher, 35, 125 - 129.
Downie J R and Barron N J (2000) Evolution and religion: attitudes of Scottish first year biology and medical students to the teaching of evolutionary biology. Journal of Biological Education, 34, 139 - 146.
Eger M (1991) Dissonance in the theory and practice of rationality: teaching evolution and teaching morals. In History, philosophy, and science teaching, selected readings, ed. Matthews M R, pp. 63 - 94. Toronto CAN and New York, USA: OISE Press.
Ehrlich P R and Holm R W (1963) The process of evolution. New York, USA: McGraw-Hill.
Eiseley L (1958) Darwin's century: evolution and the men who discovered it. Garden City, New York, USA: Doubleday. (Reprinted in 1961 by Anchor Books)
Eldredge N (1999) The pattern of evolution. New York, USA: Freeman.
Eldredge N (2001) The triumph of evolution: and the failure of creationism. New York, USA: Freeman.
Eldredge N and Gould S J (1972) Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism. In Models in paleobiology, ed. Schopf T J M, pp. 82 - 115. San Francisco, USA: Freeman/Cooper.
Fetzer J H (1993) Philosophy of science. New York, USA: Paragon House.
Flammer L (2001) Several texts use evolution approach. The American Biology Teacher, 63, 640.
Gallup G (1982, 1993) The Gallup Poll. Wilmington, Deleware, USA: Scholarly Resources.
Giere R N (1984) Understanding scientific reasoning. 2nd edn. New York, USA: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Gish D T (1973) Creation, evolution, and the historical evidence. The American Biology Teacher, 35, 132 - 140.
Goodman E (1999) Those ever-evolving creationists. The Boston Globe, Aug 19, section A, 19.
Gould S J (1982) Darwinism and the expansion of evolutionary theory. Science, 216, 380 - 387.
Hazard E B (2001) Letter to the editor. The American Biology Teacher, 63, 638 - 640.
Hodson D (1991) Philosophy of science and science education. In History, philosophy and science teaching, selected readings, ed. Matthews M R, pp. 19 - 32. Toronto, CAN and New York, USA: OISE Press.
Hull D L (1988) Science as a process: an evolutionary account of the social and conceptual development of science. Chicago, USA and London, UK: The University of Chicago Press. (Paperback edition, 1990)
Huxley J (1942) Evolution, the modern synthesis. London, UK: Allen and Unwin.
Huxley T H (1863) Man's place in nature. Reprinted (2001): New York, USA: The Modern Library.
James W (1907) Pragmatism: a new name for some old ways of thinking. New York, USA: Longman, Green and Company. (Reprinted in 1995, as Pragmatism, by Dover, New York)
Johnson P E (1993) Darwin on trial. 2nd edn. Downers Grove, Illinois, USA: InterVarsity Press.
Kantor J R (1953) The logic of modern science. Bloomington, Indiana, USA: Principia Press.
Kordig C R (1971) The justification of scientific change. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel; and New York, USA: Humanities Press.
LaBar M (1999) Categorization of evolution meanings is proposed. The American Biology Teacher, 61, 484 - 485.
Lamarck J B (1809) Philosophie zoologique. Paris, France: Chez Dentu. (English translation, 1914, by H. Elliot, London, UK: Macmillan)
Lange K E (2002) Wolf to woof: the evolution of dogs. National Geographic, 201, 2 - 11.
Lennox J G (1992) Philosophy of biology. In Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, ed. Salmon M H et al., pp. 269 - 309. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, USA: Prentice-Hall. (Reprinted, 1999, by Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, Indiana, USA)
Lewis W H (1967) Cytocatalytic evolution in plants. The Botanical Review, 33, 105 - 115.
Li W H and Graur D (1991) Fundamentals of molecular evolution. Sunderland, Massachusetts, USA: Sinauer Associates.
Marbach-Ad G (2001) Attempting to break the code in student comprehension of genetic concepts. Journal of Biological Education, 35, 183 - 189.
Margulis L (1993) Symbiosis in cell evolution. 2nd edn. New York, USA: Freeman.
Matthews D (2001) Effect of a curriculum containing creation stories on attitudes about evolution. The American Biology Teacher, 63, 404 - 409.
Mayr E (1961) Cause and effect in biology. Science, 134, 1501 - 1506.
Mayr E and Provine W B (eds.) (1998) The evolutionary synthesis: perspectives on the unification of biology. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA and London, UK: Harvard University Press. (Paperback edition: 1998; modified from hardback edition: 1980)
McKeachie W J, Lin Y G, and Strayer J (2002) Creationist vs. evolutionary beliefs: effects on learning biology. The American Biology Teacher, 64, 189 - 192.
McMurtrie B (2001) Darwinism under attack. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 48, A8 - 11.
Minkoff E C (1983) Evolutionary biology. Reading, Massachusetts, USA: Addison-Wesley.
Minkoff E C and Baker P J (2001) Biology today: an issues approach, 2nd edn. NewYork, USA and London, UK: Garland.
Moody P A (1970) Introduction to evolution. 3rd edn. New York, USA: Harper & Row.
Moore R (2000) The revival of creationism in the United States. Journal of Biological Education, 35, 17 - 21.
Moore R (2001) Educational malpractice: why do so many biology teachers endorse creationism? Skeptical Inquirer, 25, 38 - 43.
Moore R (2002) Do standards matter? How the quality of state standards relate to evolution instruction. The Science Teacher, 69, 49 - 51.
Morris H M and Whitcomb J C (1961) The genesis flood: the biblical record and scientific implications. Grand Rapids, Michigan, USA: Baker Book House.
Morris R (2001) The evolutionists: the struggle for Darwin's soul. New York, USA: Freeman.
Munger J C (2001) Attitudes about evolution article draws varied responses. The American Biology Teacher, 63, 637.
Musante S (1999) New statement on evolution/creationism in schools. The American Biology Teacher, 61, 412.
National Academy of Sciences (1998) Teaching about evolution and the nature of science. Washington, DC, USA: National Academy Press.
National Research Council (1996) National Science Education Standards. Washington, DC, USA: National Academy Press.
Popper K R (1962) Conjectures and refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge. New York, USA: Basic Books.
Price G M (1926) Evolutionary geology and the new catastrophism. California, USA: Pacific Press.
Quine W V O (1961) From a logical point of view. New York, USA: Harper & Row.
Raven P H and Johnson G B (2002) Biology, 6th edn. New York, USA: McGraw-Hill.
Royce J (1892) The spirit of modern philosophy. Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton-Mifflin.
Rutledge M and Mitchell M A (2002) High school biology teachers' knowledge structure, acceptance & teaching of evolution. The American Biology Teacher, 64, 21 - 28.
Rutledge M L and Warden M A (2000) Evolutionary theory, the nature of science & high school biology teachers: critical relationships. The American Biology Teacher, 62, 23 - 31.
Ruse M (1988) Philosophy of biology today. Albany, New York, USA: State University of New York Press.
Ruse M (2001) The evolution wars: a guide to the debates. New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA: Rutgers University Press.
Shellberg T (2001) Teaching how to answer 'why' questions about biology. The American Biology Teacher, 63, 16 - 19.
Sinclair A and Pendarvis M P (1998) Evolution vs. conservative religious beliefs: can biology instructors assist students with their dilemma? Journal of College Science Teaching, Dec 1997/Jan 1998, 167 - 170.
Singer M (1999) Believing is not understanding. The Washington Post, Aug. 18, section A, 19.
Smith J M (1998) Science and myth. In The Philosophy of Biology, ed. Hull D L and Ruse M pp 374 - 382. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. (Initially published in Natural History, 93/11, 1984)
Sober E (2000) Philosophy of biology. 2nd edn. Boulder, Colorado, USA: Westview Press.
Storer T I, Usinger R L, Stebbens R C, and Nybakken, J W (1979) General Zoology. 6th edn. New York, USA: McGraw-Hill.
Thomas D E (2000). Science trumps creationism in New Mexico. Skeptical Inquirer 24, 5 - 6.
Van Fraassen B (1979) Relative frequences. In Hans Reichenbach: logical empiricist, ed. Salmon W C pp. 129 - 167. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel.
Velikovsky I (1955) Earth in upheaval. Garden City, New York, USA: Doubleday.
Warburton N (1999) Philosophy: the basics. 3rd edn. London, UK: Routledge.
White M (1972) Science and sentiment in America: philosophical thought from Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Wilson E O (2000) Sociobiology: the new synthesis. 25th anniversary edn. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Winterer J (2001) A lab exercise explaining Hardy-Weinberg equlibrium and evolution effectively. The American Biology Teacher, 63, 678 - 687.
Wise D U (1998) Creationism's geologic time scale. American Scientist, 86, 160 - 173.
Young D (1992) The discovery of evolution. The Natural History Museum, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Zimmer C (2001) Evolution: the triumph of an idea. New York, USA: Harper-Collins.

APPENDIX

EVOLUTION TEST
This questionnaire asks your opinion on certain matters in biology. There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers, and you should feel free to answer questions according to what you believe. The test should be anonymous.

PART A
The 'Canine Test.' Write letter of selected answer in answer blank.
1. If rabbits are allowed to breed without control (if dogs, or other control measures are not present) the rabbit population numbers can become so large as to seem a nuisance (e.g., gardens may be damaged or destroyed).
(a) Agree
(b) Disagree
(c) I don't know what to believe (I have no basis for judging)
1. [ ]
2. If dogs, cats, coyotes, or other potential predators are present, the number of rabbits in a population may be significantly reduced.
(a) Agree
(b) Disagree
(c) Don't know (no basis for judging)
2. [ ]
3. Concerning dogs:
(a) Many dogs look different; there are different breeds of dogs
(b) All dogs look approximately the same
(c) No basis for judging
3. [ ]
4. Some dogs (e.g., German Shepherds) resemble, can still breed (produce offspring) with, and were probably derived from
(a) Sheep
(b) Wolves
(c) Dogs never came from anything but other dogs
4. [ ]
5. Some dogs are well-suited (through developed characteristics) for sheep-herding, some for pulling sleds, some for hunting, some as watchdogs, some mainly for companionship, and certain kinds of dogs have (though illegally) even been bred for fighting.
(a) Agree
(b) Disagree
(c) No basis for judging
5. []
6. Particular dog breeds, e.g. Chihuahuas, because their 'desirable' traits (e.g. small size, large ears, apple-dome head, colour pattern) are inherited, were (and still are) bred to alter and/or select and maintain characteristics of the breed, and sold to consumers.
(a) Yes, I believe this is true
(b) No, I think this is false
(c) I don't know
6. []
7. Before the extensive dog breeding programs that we now have, going back several hundred to several thousand years, it is reasonable to believe that dogs (in the absence of particular breeds) probably resembled each other even more than they do today.
(a) Agree
(b) Disagree
(c) I don't have an opinion
7. []
8. If a number of male dogs are placed in a pen, some may fight over food (if it is scarce), or perhaps over any female dogs in the pen.
(a) Agree
(b) Disagree
(c) No basis for judging
8. []
9. If humans don't intervene, some of the dogs in the pen (above) may be hurt or killed. The stronger and more agile male dogs will be more likely to survive, and perhaps breed with female dogs still present.
(a) Agree
(b) Disagree
(c) I have no basis for guessing
9. []
10. Dogs, or humans for that matter, can remain susceptible to infectious disease because the genetic matter of these infectious bacteria (e.g. causing tuberculosis in humans) and viruses (such as the flu virus in humans and the distemper virus in dogs) can change, sometimes (in the case of bacteria) in response to antibiotics. In human context, put simply, such 'germs' can develop a resistance to a person's immune system and/or to treatment.
(a) Agree
(b) Disagree
(c) Don't know
10. []

PART B
Some information on concepts of evolution. Before answering questions 11 - 20 (Part C) please read briefly through these principles of evolution immediately below, most corresponding closely to components of Charles Darwin's (1859) theory.
Population Growth. Based on the study (by Darwin) of Thomas Malthus' Essay on the Principle of Population, the conclusion is that a population, unchecked, will eventually grow beyond its own sustainability (beyond available food resources). Malthus clearly had humans in mind with this assertion, but Darwin applied this idea to various animal populations.
Variation. Natural (or artificially altered) species populations exhibit variability in appearance, metabolism, behaviour, etc., even though we may readily recognize the members (individuals) as belonging to a given species. In fact, it is usually relatively easy to tell one individual of a species from another individual of the same species. Though precise information on the cause of variation was not available to Darwin, scientists eventually came to understand that variation often has a definite hereditary basis, relating to gene mutation and recombination. Knowledge of the genetic basis of variation now extends to the molecular level (i.e. to DNA).
Struggle for existence. Given limited food (or reproductive) resources, competition among members of a species will occur. This can result in the death or disabling of certain members of the species population.
Predator effect. Not only is there competition, but predation by larger, stronger animals (carnivores, such as bobcats and hawks) can limit the population size of smaller animals, such as field mice.
Adaptation. Some members of a species population possess certain characteristics (longer teeth, sharper claws, more intelligence, less need for water, greater strength, greater running ability, etc.), which 'adapt' them to survive (provide them an advantage) in a given environment better than other members.
Survival of the fittest. Though adaptation and 'fitness' are not identical concepts, the assumption is that the best adapted or most fit members of the population are most likely to survive.
Differential reproduction (and sexual selection). If the fittest survive or out-compete others of their kind (e.g. through 'display'), they will be the members of the population to reproduce; their adaptations, if genetically based, are passed on to offspring.
Natural selection. This is one of Darwin's main contributions. The idea here is that the most favourable or beneficial adaptations, as evident in surviving (presumably the 'fittest') organisms, will be 'selected naturally' in (and by) a particular environment (to which these organisms are suited). How selection works to change species (characteristics) may be easily visualized by the 'artificial selection' (by humans) that has produced and maintained (even with further change) the many different breeds of dogs, and their desirable characteristics. Darwin, in fact, got some of his ideas on natural selection from observing 'artificial selection' done on pigeons (by London Pigeon Clubs), and through his own rearing of varieties of these birds.
Population genetic and physical change. As a result of the preceding, a species population can eventually change in genetic composition (genotype), and often in appearance (phenotype); this change is evident in the altered structural, functional or biochemical features of population members 'selected' naturally, or artificially, by their particular 'environment.'
Origin through descent. If enough change occurs in a population, and especially if two initially similar (but now more dissimilar) populations become separated (by geography or other factors), an origin of breeds, varieties, or even species, may occur. Such descendant populations are thus derived from an initial, somewhat more homogeneous 'ancestral' species population. This concept, which implies that species are not 'fixed' but can change, is referred to as 'branching descent' or 'descent with modification.'

PART C
Thought questions on evolution. The above statements on evolution are briefly listed below, numbers 11 - 20). Match, with each, one of the 'canine questions' (1 - 10) which seems to apply (write number of canine question in blank). Whereas more than one 'canine question' may apply to a given principle, and a canine question may be used more than once, select one that you feel is a reasonable match in each case (regardless of whether or not it has been used before).

Evolution principles                          Fill in one 'Canine
number (each blank)                                  Test' question
11. Population growth                                    11. []
12. Variation                                            12. []
13. Struggle for existence                               13. []
14. Predator effect                                      14. []
15. Adaptation                                           15. []
16. Survival of the fittest                              16. []
17. Differential reproduction                            17. []
18. Natural (and artificial) selection                   18. []
19. Population genetic and physical change               19. []
20. Origin through descent                               20. []

PART D
General views on the application and significance of evolution; write letter of selected answer in blank provided; one answer per blank, please.
21. Connection between canine-test questions and the principles of evolution
(a) There are a number of clear connections
(b) There are a few clear connections
(c) There is only one clear connection
(d) There may be connections, but these are not clear
(e) There is no connection between the canine questions and evolution
21. []
22. Potential significance. I believe the concept or topic of evolution to have:
(a) Significance in my life and in society
(b) Little or no significance in my life and society
(c) Significance in my life but not in society
(d) Significance in society but not in my life
(e) Potential as a popular movie topic, but that's about all
22. []
23. I believe the theory of evolution (its importance) is:
(a) The primary explanation for the development and progression of life on earth
(b) Valid, but secondary to other explanations of changes in life forms
(c) Only rarely important in explaining life's progression
(d) Of no importance in explaining life on earth
(e) I do not yet have a firm opinion on its importance to the descent of life
23. []
24. Compatibility? I believe the theory of evolution to be
(a) Compatible with my belief system
(b) Seriously (mostly) in conflict with my belief system
(c) Partially in conflict with my belief system
(d) I'm not sure, but I will keep an open mind
(e) I could never believe the theory of evolution, no matter what the evidence supporting it
24. []
25. Related to # 24, how much of the theory of evolution am I able to accept?
(a) All of it
(b) Most of it
(c) Some of it
(d) A little of it
(e) None of it
25. []
Student comments:

WEBSITES
www.creationresearch.org
The Creation Research Society
www.nabt.org
National Association of Biology Teachers, USA, publishers of The American Biology Teacher.
www.natcenscied.org
National Center for Science Education (Oakland, California, USA)

The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited. To contact the publisher: http://www.kdp.org/

Long after the students have returned to the hallways of Columbine High School, the nation continues to look for answers to the problems of violence and killing in our public schools. Shootings in towns like West Paducah, Jonesboro, Edinboro, Springfield, and Littleton have forced the nation to search for someone or something to blame for the vicious killings and the pure disregard for human life. At one time or another, weak gun control laws, the breakdown of the family, the entertainment industry, and school gangs and cliques have all served as scapegoats for the violence in today's young adults.
But as we wait and watch for the next shooting, we engage in a time of soul searching and wrestling with this incomprehensible violence. Many have concluded that the solution is legislation calling for stricter gun control laws and stiffer penalties for the offenders, while others call for metal detectors, meshed book bags, armed police, and other security measures in an attempt to make schools and students safer. Because parents are often targeted for blame when students have problems, some have suggested that parents be held accountable for their children's behavior or that social agencies provide help for families and parents with troubled teens. Conservative Christian groups, among others, have called for a school prayer amendment, sparking as much controversy as the violence itself. The idea of school prayer as a means to curb violence forces us to ask tough questions. What role should school prayer play in the nation's attempt to prevent or correct the violent temperaments that seem to be increasing in our young people? How should a diverse and democratic society deal with issues of religion in public schools?

WHY THE CONCERN?
As Fraser (1999, 3) noted, "God's place within the public schools of the United States has been debated, and subject to controversy, for as long as there have been public schools." Citizens have always disagreed about the proper relationship between religion and public education. From displaying the Ten Commandments to determining how students should study about religion, the debate about what is appropriate and acceptable in public education remains as heated as ever. In particular, school prayer sparks a great deal of controversy.
Since the mid-1980s, there have been persistent attempts to reintroduce prayer as a normal part of the school day, rooted in significant public and political support. National polls regularly indicate that as much as 80 percent of the nation consistently favors returning prayer to school (Barton 1997; Rose and Gallup 1998; Loconte 1995; Kathan 1989; Walsh 2001).
Beyond a public embracing of school prayer, a time of action may be approaching. Indeed, the idea seems to be gaining popularity in the halls of Congress. Since the Republican Party added school prayer to its social agenda in 1980, many candidates pursuing political office have used this issue for their own political gain. As Kathan (1989, 236) observed, "We live in a day of single-issue candidates and pressure groups, and school prayer persists as an attractive platform because there is so much mileage to be gained from it." Several members of Congress have attempted to add an amendment to the Constitution that would permit school prayer. Furthermore, the current administration and Republican Party support some type of school prayer.
Several powerful conservative Christian groups also exert considerable pressure and influence on the members of Congress. For example, the Christian Coalition has spent $550,000 lobbying for an amendment that would allow school prayer (Fraser 1999). These groups also persuade the public through television, various publications, and their direct involvement in the political process through their support of conservative candidates.
With such active support and a wide range of societal ills, school prayer is in a very favorable climate. This issue will not go away (Kathan 1989). Though state-sponsored prayer is currently unacceptable, it is important to continue to examine the arguments for and against school prayer critically and to consider the many consequences and implications.

SCHOOL PRAYER V. PRAYER IN SCHOOLS
The issue of school prayer leaves citizens deeply divided, confused, and often angry. Much of the tension that arises when addressing any form of school prayer is often based on misunderstandings of church and state issues and confusion regarding the distinction between school prayer and prayer in schools.
For our purposes, school prayer is the recitation of prayer by staff members and/or students as a regular part of the school's daily routine. Though there have been various school prayer proposals, ranging from a moment of silence to a time set aside for formal student-led voluntary prayer, the important aspect is that some type of prayer will become a regular part of the formal exercises of the school day.
Any type of school prayer would involve school officials in the approval and development process of a daily school-wide prayer and their decision regarding how, when, and where students should pray. For example, the school might designate several minutes at the beginning of the school day for prayer. The administration could possibly have a student read a prayer aloud over the intercom system, and students could voluntarily participate. The remainder of the time might be spent in silence.
Prayer in schools is quite different. Despite complaints from conservative Christian groups that prayer has been removed from school since the Supreme Court decisions of the early 1960s (Engel v. Vitale 1962; Abington School District v. Schempp 1963), this is not the case. As McMillan (1988, 200) noted, "the Supreme Court has never ruled that voluntary acts of individual, private prayer are illegal" in schools. Instead, the courts have held that public school students could not be required to participate in religious devotional acts, such as reading from the Bible or reciting the Lord's prayer. The Supreme Court has upheld the Equal Access Act that allows student religious groups to meet and pray as long as the school has established an open forum that enables other noncurricular groups to use school facilities. The forum is limited in that only students can form groups, but permitting religious groups to use this forum does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Currently, students do have the right to pray in public schools. This can be either alone or in groups, as long as the activity does not disrupt the school or infringe upon the rights of others. In addition, the prayer time must be voluntary and student initiated. For example, students can gather at the flagpole for prayer, they can pray before tests, they are able to gather on school grounds for private prayer, conduct Bible studies, develop prayer clubs, or any other form of prayer considered constitutional. These forms of prayer are acceptable as long as the event is not sponsored by the school and other students are not pressured to attend. This type of prayer in schools greatly differs from any type of school prayer amendment.
Formal school prayer has been removed from public education, but students are not forced to leave their religion at the door. They have the right to share their faith with others and read the Scriptures. Students can also express their personal religious views in class or as part of a written assignment if relevant to the discussion and content area. Furthermore, student involvement in groups such as Teens for Christ, Young Life, and the Fellowship of Christian Athletes demonstrates that there are opportunities to become actively involved in spiritual life within public schools.

WHY SCHOOL PRAYER?
Responding to the increase in school violence, conservative politicians, lawmakers, and religious activists have argued that there is a place for a constitutional amendment allowing voluntary, student-led prayer in public schools. Their argument appears to be twofold. First, they appeal to religious tradition, noting that the country was founded and built on religious principles. Thus, the return to prayer in schools is simply an appropriate representation of our country's emphasis on faith and religious freedom. The exclusion of prayer and the Ten Commandments, along with curricular silence on religion in textbooks and other measures to remove faith and religion from the classroom, are all evidence of an improper hostility toward religion and an attempt to negate the religious roots of this nation. Our secular society, they argue, has effectively diminished the vital role of religion by burying the country's religious principles.
Second, as Loconte (1995, 24) has noted, school prayer advocates argue that "schools and other public institutions have a responsibility to acknowledge the Deity, because denial of God in civic life carries profound social consequences." Such theological proponents use the book of Romans in the New Testament, which describes the moral consequences of rejection of God, to argue that our current moral decay is the main consequence of a society that rejects God and His moral laws. Teenage pregnancies, higher divorce rates, increases in criminal activity, and lower student standardized tests scores, just to name a few, are all signs of this decay (Barton 1994). These advocates equate "these trends with the ejection of prayer and God from the schools" (Kathan 1989, 234). Accordingly, public schools have the social responsibility to acknowledge God, religion, and prayer appropriately.

IS SCHOOL PRAYER THE SOLUTION?
It is difficult to believe the Conservative Christian claim that the removal of school prayer from public school in the early 1960s is the significant cause of societal problems. Though Christians from various denominations and theological perspectives accept the theological basis for school prayer, many of these same individuals doubt the appropriateness and ability of school prayer to solve societal problems. A growing number of conservative, evangelical Christians are concerned about the difficulties that school prayer creates regarding matters of faith, conscience, and civility (Loconte 1995). School prayer has never played a major role in maintaining a moral or religious consensus, nor will prayer either slow or reverse current moral trends or lead to a spiritual or cultural renewal (Loconte 1995).
Institutionalizing prayer will not help the current moral crisis or solve societal problems. Instead, school prayer will do nothing more than further trivialize religious and spiritual matters, diminishing religion's place in human life and academics, and as a legitimate way of understanding the world.
First, there is a concern regarding content. To whom will students pray? The state can privilege neither one religion over another nor religion over nonreligion. The content of any school prayer would certainly surface as a major issue. To remain neutral in religious matters and maintain the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, even the most conservative members of the Supreme Court would argue that any school prayer must be nonsectarian. Yet, as Nord (1995, 261) argued, "There is no such thing as nonsectarian religion; to pray is to take sides among religions."
Under these restrictions and considering the current cultural climate, these prayers will be constructed in a manner not to offend anyone. If we reinstated some type of school prayer in public schools, "it could lead to a watered-down prayer acknowledging some kind of 'lowest common denominator deity' or to a kind of 'affirmative action' plan in which prayers would be offered to all kinds of deities and goddesses" (Grounds, in Gaddy, Hall, and Marzano 1996, 193). These ecumenical or one-size-fits-all prayers will neither restore morality to our culture nor lead children to salvation. Instead, we will develop a climate implying that, as long as you make reference to some kind of deity, then you're spiritually fit. The details of your religion and faith are insignificant. Furthermore, these ecumenical prayers will provide students with a vague and empty understanding of God and eventually carve out the heart of the Christian faith by removing any personal aspects.
Second, school prayer fails to recognize and keep sacred the deeply spiritual character of prayer. Prayer is a time during which people of faith can draw near and come into the presence of God. It is a time to interact with and respond sincerely to God. Any type of a formal school prayer would reduce prayer to a ritual that lacks significant meaning. Similar to the pledge of allegiance, students will quickly memorize the words without ever truly reflecting upon its meaning or why they engage in this activity every school morning. It will not be long before school prayer is an empty and meaningless ritual.
More important, one must wonder how seriously administrators, teachers, and students will view this prayer time, especially because these prayers may not reflect their particular faith or lack thereof. Based upon experiences with private religious schools, teachers and students often mumble their way through a written recited prayer without any sense of what they are saying or genuine reflection. Other times, their minds are distracted by their peers, the upcoming class, or the hectic school day. Finally, how seriously will students respond if formal prayer is brought back into the school and connected with school regulations and boredom?
Third, what about students whose faith differs from that of the Christian faith? As the American Civil Liberties Union (1998) reported, the United States is one "of the most devout nations in the world, and it is at the same time the most religiously diverse. The United States has more than 1,500 different religious bodies and sects--including 75 divisions of Baptists alone. This country also has 360,000 churches, mosques, and synagogues, all coexisting in relative harmony." Clearly, our nation includes people of numerous religions that lie outside of the Judeo-Christian tradition (Loconte 1995). Also, within the student body of public schools, there are some self-proclaimed atheists and agnostics.
This religious diversity reminds us that there are many different kinds of prayers and diverse ways of praying. Public schools find themselves at the center of this religious diversity, and conservative Christians who argue for school prayer seem to dismiss this pluralism as a vital component of the school prayer issue. The heart of the problem is that school prayer advocates fail to respect the faith of a wide diversity of citizens by wanting to put prayer back into the school the same way it was before its removal. It is, however, impossible to turn back the clock to a time when school prayer and Bible reading were norms and diversity was not considered a major concern. Nevertheless, we must remember that public education is supported by all taxpayers; for that reason, public schools should be designed for all children.
Furthermore, conservative Christian groups would likely oppose other groups who want to impose their views upon students and the school curriculum. How would the Religious Right respond to a situation in which Buddhists, adherents of New Age religions, or any other group of non-Christians engaged in daily readings based upon their source of authority and knowledge or developed prayers to their God? Christian groups who argue for school prayer would be outraged if other religious groups were allowed to control public education in such a manner. Yet that is exactly what they are trying to accomplish. Neither Christians nor anyone else has the right to dominate the message that is communicated in public schools.
Thus, as Nord and Haynes (1998) have demonstrated, schools do not take religion seriously; ironically, school prayer would probably further trivialize faith and religion. Prayer will be considered by many students as a trivialized ritual of little importance, impact, or value. Do we want to teach students that religion is irrelevant to their education and has little to offer regarding the personal and public problems that they face?
Prayer in public schools should remain as it is; any type of school prayer that becomes a normal part of the school's daily activities should not be reintroduced as a part of public education. Organized prayer will prove more harmful than beneficial in the long run, reinforcing the current school climate that views faith and religion as irrelevant as a legitimate way of understanding the world.

POSSIBLE SUGGESTIONS
School prayer is not the answer to all our problems. As Romanowski and Talbert (2000, 134) argued, "A careful examination of the American public school system reveals the stunning fact that American students can receive a high school diploma, and even graduate with high honors, without ever confronting a religious idea." Students are given the distinct message that religion is irrelevant to all academic disciplines and that religion and faith is something that is by nature a private matter with no place in the public arena. It seems that the overall diminishing role of religion as a force in defining a moral life and building character in students has also contributed to the current cultural climate.
Yet separationists have argued that the wall dividing church and state should be reinforced, especially in these times of greater diversity. We should be concerned with the possible dangers of church and state issues as well as the consequences that will occur when our public life is stripped of religion and morality. Yet the push for school prayer is "the wrong solution to a real urgent problem: confusion about the proper role of religion in public education" (Haynes and Thomas 1995, 8). Conservative Christians and other religious groups should want something much more substantive than school prayer. What are possible responses?
First, though more public attention has been focused on school prayer, reintroducing the religious dimensions of our culture in school curricula is a much more important concern. As Nord and Haynes (1998, 25) argued, "The current curriculum does inhibit religion by marginalizing religion in our intellectual and cultural life, (implicitly) conveying the sense that religion is irrelevant in the search for truth in the various domains of the curriculum." Therefore, conservative Christian groups must shift away from school prayer and begin to center on how schools can end the curricular silence regarding religion. Emphasis should be placed on how schools can provide opportunities for students to learn about the influences of religion and how the religious dimensions of society can be integrated into the appropriate subject areas. For example, Romanowski and Talbert (2000) argued that the role of religion must be integrated within the U.S. history classroom to demonstrate for students the relevancy and importance of religion and faith to human history and society. The authors suggest several ways that schools can accomplish this. If conservative Christians want students to see the profound role of faith and religion in the lives of U.S. citizens, they should spend less time and effort fighting for school prayer and focus on the appropriate integration of the role of religion throughout the curriculum.
Second, though the current status of religious expression in public school may have shifted greatly from the intent of the Founding Fathers (Barton 1997), the constitution does provide opportunities for religious expression among students in public schools. Religious groups should use the legal tools already available to express and further their faith as they deem appropriate. More important, there is a need for religious groups, communities, and parents to examine school policies and practices continually regarding religious expression and pursue, with whatever means available, their constitutional rights. The protection of religious rights in public education must be preserved. The current school climate, the absurdly extreme positions that some school districts have taken in an attempt to sidestep religion, and the confusion that surrounds church and state issues make this concern vital.
Third, for many school officials, dealing with religious expression is too controversial. They find themselves fearful of both personal and legal conflicts. Most educators are aware of how easily religion, in any form, riles the community. This fear, coupled with the growing bulk of church and state litigation, leads to an overzealous cautiousness on the part of many school officials. As a result, administrators overreact, creating misinformed decisions and misguided, incorrect school policies and procedures.
Increased litigation over issues such as school prayer has created the impression that any discussion about religion in public schools is forbidden. Parents, teachers, and school officials suffer from confusion or misunderstandings regarding church and state issues, relying on the position of absolute separation as their church and state guidepost. This understanding of church and state renders any mention of religion in a public school as unconstitutional, thus having a profound impact on how teachers and students can and cannot express their religious beliefs. Yet is this an accurate perspective regarding religion in the classroom?
The position of absolute separation has not historically been used as a guide to the interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Rather, the courts use neutrality, a criterion that requires schools to provide fairness to religion, as the guideline in deciding church and state cases. Essentially, the state must remain neutral in religious matters to prevent preferring one religion over another or showing hostility toward any religion. Clearly, it is anything but neutral for schools to entirely ignore religion. As Nord and Haynes (1998, 18) declared, "Schools cannot be in the business of religious indoctrination.... But at the same time, schools have an obligation to make sure religion is taken seriously." Therefore, this commonly held belief of absolute separation of church and state, in its own sense, violates the Establishment Clause and the idea of state neutrality. However, with such a complex and controversial issue as school prayer, it seems that the safest choice for most school leadership is to opt for complete avoidance of the role of religion.
Therefore, school board members and educators, especially principals and superintendents, must develop accurate and comprehensive understandings of church and state issues. By doing so, they can make fair and accurate decisions regarding the role religion can and should play in public education. Also, citizens who use the public schools must understand fully that the constitution does not prohibit prayer. They must become informed about church and state issues and what rights they have and do not have to express their faith and religion in public schools.
Finally, it is important to address an irony often found in the school prayer issue. Religious conservatives who are outspoken against both government involvement in public education and special interest groups that want their voice to become dominant in the curriculum seem too willing to surrender the sacred religious expression of prayer to government control.
No one group should have the right to dominate public schools with forced prayer or any other activity that establishes their religion. However, parents and communities should play a role in shaping their schools' curricula and moral climate. This is vital and a healthy part of the public education system. After all, modeling constitutional principles and involving the community in schools should be at the heart of the vision for public education. The difficulty, regarding religion, is finding a way that a diverse and democratic society can address religious issues in public schools in a fair and just way "that is both religiously tolerant and religiously informed" (Fraser 1999, 7).
School prayer will make little, if any, difference as a possible solution to the numerous problems we face as a society. It will not reduce the absence of religion in the classroom, lead others to salvation, "undo prejudices against faith," or "strengthen the already faithful" (Loconte 1995, 31). We cannot force religion and beliefs on students, which is what school prayer would accomplish. We can, however, provide students with opportunities to become religiously informed, enabling them to begin to understand the important role that religion and faith play in private and public life. This approach to the role of religion is more likely to persuade students that these matters are of value and importance.
ADDED MATERIAL
Michael H. Romanowski is Associate Professor of Education at Ohio Northern University in Ada. His research interests include current issues in education, social studies education, and teacher education.

REFERENCES
American Civil Liberties Union. 1998. New ACLU ad asks: If there's prayer in school whose prayer should it be? New York: ACLU. Available at: http://www.aclu.org/news/n041498a.html.
Barton, D. 1997. Original intent: The courts, the constitution, and religion. Aledo, Tex.: Wallbuilder Press.
Barton, D. 1994. America: To pray or not to pray? A statistical look at what has happened since 39 million students were ordered to stop praying in public schools. Aledo, Tex.: Wallbuilder Press.
Fraser, J. W. 1999. Between church and state: Religion and public education in a multicultural America. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Gaddy, B. B., T. W. Hall, and R. J. Marzano. 1996. School wars: Resolving our conflicts over religion and values. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Haynes, C. C., and O. Thomas. 1995. Beyond the school prayer debate: Taking religion seriously in public schools. Rights, Responsibilities and Respect: A Newsletter from the California Three R's Project (winter/spring).
Kathan, B. W. 1989. Prayer and the public schools: The issue in historical perspective and implications for religious education today. Religious Education 84(2): 232-48.
Loconte, J. 1995. Lead us not into temptation: A Christian case against school prayer. Policy Review 71: 24-31.
McMillan, R. 1988. School prayer: A problem of questions and answers. Religion & Public Education 15(2): 200-203.
Nord, W. A. 1995. Religion and American education: Rethinking a national dilemma. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Nord, W. A., and C. C. Haynes. 1998. Taking religion seriously across the curriculum. Alexandria, Va.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.
Romanowski, M. H., and K. M. Talbert. 2000. Addressing the influence of religion and faith in American history. The Clearing House 73(3): 134-37.
Rose, L. C., and A. M. Gallup. 1998. The 30th annual Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup poll of the public's attitudes toward the public schools. Phi Delta Kappan 80(1): 41-56.
Walsh, M. 2001. Public sees role of religion in schools. Education Week 20(18): 13.

The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited. To contact the publisher: http://www.heldref.org/

Russell Baker once said that in our time people cite Tocqueville without reading him even more than they do the Bible and Shakespeare. Every American president since Dwight Eisenhower has quoted him, no doubt without reading him, and some of our professors, to say nothing of lesser citizens, have picked up their habit of fishing for what they like, and throwing back the rest, in Tocqueville's great work Democracy in America.
It is no mystery why everyone wants Tocqueville's support: his is both the best book on democracy and the best book on America--two subjects that for Americans, at least, are inseparable. We cannot fail to be interested in a book so renowned, but because of a certain laziness whose source is our partisanship we fail to read it through or read it carefully, lest we come upon something difficult to accept. The purpose here is not to invoke Tocqueville in a vain attempt to transcend partisanship, a possibility he rejected. But perhaps he can do something to raise the awareness of both liberals and conservatives, and get them to see that their own party, and not just the other party, has questions it needs to face.
We address liberals and conservatives rather than independents. Most thinking people are either liberals or conservatives, and most independents, instead of standing above party as they believe, actually pick from both parties unthinkingly, trying to have their cake and eat it too. Tocqueville's first lesson to our independents is the inevitability of partisan opinion. For "in all free societies" he says, there exists a set of two opinions "as old as the world." One wants to restrict "popular" or "public" power, the other to extend it indefinitely.
Clearly, the parties of Tocqueville's France were not the same as the parties of America today. Then one party, nostalgic for the traditional order of hierarchy and religion, bitterly rejected the postrevolutionary order in toto, and the other party, zealously championing the Revolution's principles of liberty, equality and fraternity, set itself in opposition to everything--bad or good--associated with the Old Regime. Despite the differences one may find, Tocqueville in fact has a good deal to say about the central doctrines of our conservatives and liberals--self-interest for conservatives and community for liberals. Let us see what he would say to current promoters of these hot ideas.
We begin with conservatives, the party that would narrow popular or public power principally in the name of self-interest. This party, because of its own sometimes inept rhetoric, as well as the caricature given it by its opposition, appears as the party of the rich and powerful. It is the party that has long defended "rugged individualism" and is accused of protecting callous self-interest. Tocqueville is, of course, famous for his firm, if not heartfelt, embrace of the American doctrine of self-interest well understood. So he would seem to have much to say to any party that adopts the doctrine. Tocqueville's defenders of self-interest argue from its strength, and rather than urge men to deplore and transcend an inclination so powerful, they defend its legitimacy. They hope to turn self-interest against itself by maintaining that one's own interest is, as a rule, best secured in pursuing a general good. Well understood, self-interest even requires a certain degree of sacrifice. In the end, the doctrine may "form ... citizens who are regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted, masters of themselves." It is meant to provide a substitute for virtue, instilling the habits of virtue if not requiring elevated motives of generosity or pious self-forgetting. It does not reject religion but finds it useful for a human purpose. Rather than defining self-interest as obedience to God, the doctrine goes so far as to interpret hopes for the afterlife as an aspect of self-interest.
Self-interest well understood, Tocqueville says, is the moral doctrine best suited to the needs of modern democratic life. His endorsement of it is, however, qualified in several ways that are useful to recall. He never justifies the pursuit of self-interest for its own sake but only as the best means available to our moralists of encouraging "association." Further, he believes that the doctrine will work only when supported by free political institutions. Third, he stresses that the principle is democratic, as do today's conservatives, because it is within the reach of all. But by the same token, he recognizes that it will not inspire great virtue or even true virtue. In fact, he suggests that it may do little to sustain one aspect of virtue that ought to be within reach of almost all democratic citizens, namely courage. Finally, the doctrine is not quite true. Tocqueville does not try to deny, as do some free-market economists, that everyone has an interest in the common good. On the contrary, he affirms that some concern for the good of others is a part of human nature, a spontaneous impulse rather than behavior learned by adhering to a doctrine.
American conservatives today hardly dare profess any determination to restrict popular power: democratic feeling is too strong for that. But they seek to narrow or contain public power, especially that of the national government. In the form that they espouse the doctrine of self-interest well understood, they want to bolster local and state governments, but even more, they promote private economic enterprise together with the exercise of religion. Here, we know, are the two chief components of the Republican party, economic libertarians and religious or social conservatives. Their cooperation, Tocqueville saw, is more than just an uneasy alliance requiring luck or extraordinary political skill. The alliance has a common ground in the shared desire to restrict public power, even if each component wants to protect a quite distinct sphere from government interference.
As their critics point out, conservatives fail to see clearly that an interested self is not necessarily a strong self. Today Americans pride themselves on their "individualism," which they understand in a strong sense. But Tocqueville uses the term pejoratively to refer to the weakness of individuals in a democratic society. Democratic individuals suppose themselves to be independent, but in fact they are incapable of providing for their own well-being, still less for society as a whole. He finds something positive in the desire for independence, in the determination to "get government off our backs;" it is not, however, the mere hostility to government that conservatives often convey. Instead, he sees an inchoate aspiration for free political institutions in which citizens can be active participants.
Thus there is an important place in a democracy for a party of community to articulate longstanding goals of liberals: security for all, compassion for those in need, and full and equal participation of all citizens in social and political life.
On behalf of liberals Tocqueville willingly affirms--no small concession to them--the justice of democratic equality. So why should popular power, the power of all the people equally, not extend indefinitely? Neither does he deny--how could anyone?--that security is a legitimate concern. And even as he holds that self-interest well understood is the most suitable moral doctrine for modern times, he acknowledges that mores, or "habits of the heart," will increasingly be shaped by a disposition to compassion. These two inclinations, self-interest and compassion, are by no means incompatible. Democracy's increasingly equal and similar citizens can all but "feel the pain" of their fellows, and they will readily come to their assistance in case of need because they can identify with them, imagining themselves in trouble and needing help. Democratic citizens tend to experience their common humanity as a common neediness. Thus the compassionate concern they express for the security and dignity of the disadvantaged and elderly, or of elderly parents left financially dependent on their own children, is also a matter of present or potential interest to everyone.
With liberals, Tocqueville shares a critique of "the market," whose unfailing beneficence and sufficiency is often assumed by conservatives. He foresees as clearly as did Marx the cruel indifference to others of modern meritocratic elites. Yet he fully appreciates that the desire for material goods sustaining the modern market is not only universal but especially characteristic of the middle class. And unlike liberal wishful thinkers, he doubts that the demand for material goods can be effectively met without generating considerable inequalities. Restiveness drove earlier generations of Americans to the western frontier with an avaricious energy that Tocqueville calls a "sort of heroism." Today Americans are still restive with longing for both material pleasures and equality that are presently beyond their grasp and that set them ever on the move. At the same time, they are insecure in what they already have, and their restive motion unravels whatever social ties they will have hastily established in passing. It is democracy, not merely the market, that makes community, or even association, difficult. The more we extend democracy, the more we instill the restive, individualizing desire for material goods.
Today, liberals have champions who promise to fight for the people against the rich and powerful. What Tocqueville might say to them is that the people are better served by being enabled to fight for themselves, under a government that directs its energies to shoring up the social and political institutions and habits that make it necessary and possible for citizens to "associate"--or, in today's parlance--to participate.
Tocqueville reserves his most somber rhetoric for a description of a democracy in which citizens are shepherded into his famous "mild despotism," under which power is exercised by "school-master" administrators. Such a government may be well-meaning, competent, and effective. But its great appeal is that it promises, with all compassion, to make citizens secure and to promote their happiness, while depriving them, he says sarcastically, of "the pain of living" and "the trouble of thinking."
Modern liberals resemble to some extent the eighteenth-century intellectuals whom Tocqueville analyzed in his later book, The Old Regime. These intellectuals were determined to rationalize human life with the aid of new scientific knowledge. To this end they were eager to do away with traditional authority and institutions, replacing them with a simplified, centralized administration cleansed of partisan politics. Consumed with ambition themselves, they failed to recognize or prize it in others. Their rationalism did not take account of the irrational in human passions, and thus in its political effects turned out to be a new kind of irrationalism that stifles rather than oppresses. Our liberals today have a similar overconfidence in a similar social science, with its focus on security, its preference for centralization, and its tendency to simplify problems as well as solutions.
Democratic America, Tocqueville contends, has other, better schools, open to all, and free of charge--its political institutions, both formal and informal. Local governments, epitomized by the New England township, are "primary schools" of freedom, where one acquires the taste for freedom and learns habits of freedom. Juries, too, are schools, where the people learn how to reign as they reign. In serving, each juror acquires a respect for law, for justice, and for everyone's rights. And in being made to render a verdict, randomly selected citizens, a dozen at a time, learn to take personal responsibility for their actions.
While participating in a vast array of associations--economic, social, moral, intellectual, but especially political--citizens become accomplished in the art and science of association. When individuals pool their efforts, they may be able to meet more of their common needs without the assistance of a strong central government. They become better prepared to preserve their freedom against government, should that ever be necessary. It is always necessary to enlarge citizens' hearts and minds through participation in associations. Here they expose themselves to the various sentiments and ideas that democracy can foster in interested, if not independent, selves, instead of supposing that all are alike, as they must do when they show their compassion. Finally, each participant learns to subordinate his or her will to common purposes, as members of a free community should. Especially in political associations, which aspire to the formidable goal of governing society, they can see just how worthwhile it might be to make the effort needed to succeed at associating. As Tocqueville presents associations, they are the people's best hope for becoming the rich and powerful themselves.
Conservatives are right to accept the inevitability of self-interest and the need to understand it well, and wrong to trust too much in either the market or religion as individual solutions to public problems. Liberals are right when they worry about the well-being of the community as a whole, and wrong when they trust more in compassionate government than in the on-the-job training of democratic politics. Neither conservatives nor liberals say enough about what they as partisans experience--the extent to which their partisanship confirms and corrects the point of view of each party and shows the necessity of the other.
Liberals don't have much to say about the political ambition that drives some of them to seek public office in liberal communities; and conservatives also have trouble understanding ambition from the standpoint of homo economicus or homo religiosus. Tocqueville grants that democracy tends to impoverish ambition by putting it in the service of crass materialism or vulgar self-indulgence. Yet he also finds in democratic politics the potential to keep ambition vigorous and healthy, to diffuse it widely, and to make the self-interest of the rich or powerful beneficial to everyone. Out of self-interest, rich or eminent men who would curry popular favor to gain political office will dissemble their selfishness and pride. Eventually what begins as a calculating, feigned desire to fight for the people's interest in general prosperity may be transformed by the pleasurable experience of winning election and reelection, becoming a matter of habit and choice, even of self-imposed obligation. So defenders of self-interest might look to politics to enlighten that interest. And those who oppose self-interest in the name of community might come to see that communities actually need more vigorous self-interest in the form of ambition. The more we nourish widespread ambition, the less we have to fear the overweening power of mild despotism. In that way we can have more government and less dependency.
Both conservatives and liberals have something to learn from Tocqueville on religion. He addresses the political woes of skeptical democratic peoples, who are too much given to unstable desires and brief exertions. Tocqueville recommends that democratic governments extend the horizons of democratic communities by setting distant goals to be achieved by moderate, yet steadfast, ambition. The seemingly limited goal he specifies is seeing to it that political office comes as a reward for skill and effort. But this modest goal is in truth an infinite one. Winning the favor of a democratic electorate with unstable desires will always depend in some part on chance, and so it is beyond the capacity of a democracy to reward virtue regularly. Partial success comes within reach when political institutions and mores are well shaped; but without the support of a greater power, the goal will always remain elusive. But insofar as men can act confidently in the hope that their virtue will be rewarded--accomplishing much along the way--they will, in effect, have returned to a kind of religious faith from which politics may benefit. A democratic electorate can do God's work by seeing to it, as much as it can, that the virtuous are elected. Here is religion in the public square, as conservatives want, but not to promote religion, as liberals fear.
ADDED MATERIAL
Harvey Mansfield, the William R. Kenan Jr. Professor of Government, studies and teaches political philosophy at Harvard University. Delba Winthrop teaches political theory at Harvard University's Extension School and runs the Program on Constitutional Government in the Government Department.

The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited.

Selection of subject matter in social studies has long been a concern of educational theorists and reformers. Over the history of social studies, many prominent thinkers have advocated curricular reform with greater emphasis on in-depth study of public or controversial issues (Engle and Ochoa 1988; Evans and Saxe 1996; Hunt and Metcalf 1955; Oliver and Shaver 1966; Rugg 1921). Despite the best intentions of social studies reformers over the years, a traditional, textbook-centered, fact-myth-legend approach to teaching history has continued to dominate the social studies curriculum (Goodlad 1984; Hertzberg 1981; Shaver, Davis, and Helburn 1979; Wilen and White 1991). Previous attempts to explain the failure of issues-centered social studies reform have focused on rational explanation: the realities of schools as tenacious bureaucracies resistant to change; the dominant influence of social studies textbooks on classroom discourse; and the basically conservative orientation of social studies teachers toward content and discussion, owing in part to the mode of education they experienced as students in schools and universities (Gross 1989; Onosko 1996; Shaver 1989). We believe a cultural analysis may shed some additional light on the process by which subject matter in social studies remains relatively constant and controversial materials and issues are de-emphasized or omitted.
Although the focus of this article is on examining a major restraint on teaching social issues, we hope that the reader will not interpret this as a swan song for issues-centered education. Instead, it is intended as an attempt to understand cultural obstacles and to approach them realistically, with eyes wide open, and thus to build hope for significant progress in the field. We must fully understand the obstacles to issues-centered education before we can hope to overcome them.
From an anthropological perspective, controversial issues and topics receive little attention in schools because in the culture of schooling, and the culture of society, many controversial topics and issues are taboo. Taboo or tabu is a Polynesian word that means a general ban on a specific object, which should not be touched. For the purposes of this study, taboos may be defined as beliefs that constrain actions by making certain behaviors and discussion of certain topics forbidden or discouraged. Thus, taboo topics are those topics that social studies topics teachers may chose to avoid or de-emphasize because of their perceptions or beliefs regarding the sensitivity of the topic. Noa is the Polynesian word that has a meaning opposite from that taboo. The noa topics in social studies are topics teachers generally perceive as proper for discussion in local cultures. Those topics do not threaten the belief system of the culture (McGinnis 1992). "When society was simply structured and static, taboos were important because their goal was to preserve the status quo. Breaking a taboo often brought about punishment, danger, or ostracism from society" (Mann 1984, 10). Taboos are the "permitted and the prohibited, the do's and don'ts" and are "developed by society for its members out of self-preservation, tradition enhancing motives" (Farberow 1963, 1-2). In social studies education, taboos represent the traditional--the attitudes and actions of times past. Brown (1984) described taboos as "the power of our ancestral behaviors which haunt and control much of our present and to a large extent direct and control our future" (3). Taboos exert control on our everyday lives, as well as our schools and determine the boundaries for what is acceptable and unacceptable. Many taboos are the shadow of the sacred or the ideal.
Social studies suffers from a relatively large set of prohibitions, what anthropologists in an earlier era might have termed a "primitive mentality." Some of the prohibitions are strict, others common. The social studies teacher, subject to this way of thinking, is beset by fears, thus making certain topics potentially dangerous and prompting the teacher to avoidance based on injurious potential or "superstitution." A system of taboos imposes severe disabilities on teaching and thinking in social studies classrooms. Loosening or breaking taboos has the potential for freeing the human mind and helping to make social studies education a more exciting and interesting field of study.
Although the origins of taboos are largely inexplicable, taboos may exist because of the influence of dreams or visions and fears aroused by mishaps, or because through experience, taboos were found to produce unwholesome results or sanctions (e.g., discipline problems, an irate parent, a concerned administrator, censure). Once established, a taboo tends to multiply endlessly. The power of a taboo is transmissible, thus a prohibition against discussing one controversial topic may lead to a general prohibition against discussion of issues. Webster (1973) notes that "An object becomes tabooed which for any reason reminds one of something else tabooed" (13).
Webster (1973) defined taboo as "the conception of the mystic dangerousness of a particular object" (14). Once taboos are created, compulsions and restraints center "not on what is prohibited, but on the mere fact of prohibition" (14), leading to simple dread of the potential consequences or sanctions. Because of its mystical or occult power, a taboo topic may arouse ambivalent sentiments, ranging from fear or respect to reverence. Webster (1973) noted that "instruction in the tribal taboos is a regular feature of the initiation rites found among many primitive peoples" (17); thus experienced teachers and teacher educators are part of a web of influences initiating the beginning teacher. Student teachers in particular are subject to initiation through explicit or implied instruction in the tribal taboos of the school. A state of taboo is either inherent in an object, imposed by superior authority, or acquired by contact. Social studies taboos may be imposed by a variety of sanctioning agencies including administrators (chiefs), textbook critics, civic or religious organizations (secret societies), experienced teachers (tribal elders), professors (priests), other public functionaries, parents, or local cranks, or they may be more diffuse in origin, affecting things great and small. Some are permanent, others temporary.

RESEARCH RELATED TO TABOO TOPICS IN SCHOOLS
Harmon Zeigler's research (1967) on the political lives of teachers includes seminal work on teacher beliefs about the proper behavior of teachers and the perception of sanctions. Although he did not employ an anthropological framework in explaining his work, his findings are relevant to this article. Zeigler asked teachers to examine a list of teacher behaviors, both in class and in the community, and to indicate which of those they thought were proper. He also asked them to rank teacher behaviors in order of perceived likelihood of sanctions. Zeigler found that "teachers do not regard the classroom as a suitable forum for the expression by teachers of controversial opinions" (98). He also found that teachers' relatively high degree of fear of sanctions restricts the likelihood that they will generate classroom discussions of controversial issues or take a classroom stand on a controversial issue, and that "the greater the perception of probable sanctions, the less proper the behavior is perceived to be" (101). In general, he found that the classroom "operates basically to reinforce a belief in the desirability of maintaining the status quo" (119), and that the agents that teachers perceive as potential sanctions tend to originate from within the educational system and include parents, school board members, superintendents, principals, other teachers, and local cranks (an exception). He also found that the overall impact of perceived sanctions seems to produce docility and conformity in teachers.
Research and theory on the teaching of controversial issues is also relevant to the exploration of taboos. The terms controversial and taboo are similar in meaning, although taboo is the stronger designation. A topic may generate controversy without being taboo. For example, the interpretation of the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ("the right to keep and bear arms") may initiate controversy among students, but it is generally perceived to be an appropriate topic for classroom discussion. In a review of research on the teaching of controversial issues in social studies, Hahn (1991) situated controversial issues discussion at the heart of a democratic polity. "The rationale for including controversial issues in social studies instruction rests on the necessity of preparing citizens to participate in the democratic decision-making processes within a pluralistic society" (470). The few surveys that have been conducted of secondary social studies teachers indicate that their willingness to discuss controversial issues in the classroom varies according to the broader political culture at the time (e.g., higher during the 1960s than the 1970s and 1980s), the teacher's experience (higher among less-experienced teachers), the teacher's gender (slightly higher among males), and topic (sex-related subjects have almost always been considered taboo).
The most systematic research study on the teaching of controversial topics was conducted over twenty-five years ago. On the basis of a questionnaire sent to a random sample of Michigan high school social studies, biology, and English teachers, Massialas, Sprague, and Sweeney (1970) found that only 16 percent of teachers spent as much as 25 percent of class time on controversial topics. The majority of educators considered some controversial topics, such as race relations and the Vietnam War, appropriate for classroom discussion. Teachers were most likely to avoid sex-related topics such as abortion and homosexuality. In general, teachers who reported the highest levels of belief in student expression devoted more class time to discussion of issues.
Of what significance are discussions of taboo subjects in the classroom? At the individual level, a number of studies link controversial issues discussions, held within an open and supportive classroom environment, with increased political interest and civic tolerance and decreased dogmatism (Goldenson 1978; Grossman 1976; Ehman 1977; Torney, Oppenheim, and Farnen 1975). At the societal level, the public's ability to deliberate on significant civic issues is critical to the sustenance of democracy. Guttman (1987) has argued that "the ability [to reason about politics] is so essential to democratic education that one might question whether civics courses that succeeded in increasing political trust, efficacy, and knowledge but failed to increase the ability of students to reason about politics are indirectly repressive" (107).

EXPLORING TABOO TOPICS
Over four decades ago, Hunt and Metcalf theorized that the "problematic areas of culture" included power and the law, economics, nationalism, patriotism and foreign affairs, social class, religion and morals, race and minority group relations, and sex, courtship, and marriage. In their view, substantial aspects of each of these problematic topics were "closed areas" where conflicts between core values and beliefs and actual behaviors might be illuminated through classroom discussion (1955).
Although we find some substantiation for a similar portrayal of sensitive topics in schools through the literature and through our experiences as educators and researchers, we wonder about the relative sensitivity of these topics in the 1990s. We decided to ask a small group of social studies student teachers (N = 32) about their perceptions of taboo and noa issues. We chose to explore preservice teachers' conceptions because their responses provide a measure of teacher attitudes prior to in-depth socialization into the school culture. Further study comparing novice and veteran teachers' conceptions of taboos and noas has potential value in the planning and preparation of teacher-training programs involving issue-centered education. We began by brainstorming and then organizing a list of topics that we believed might represent sensitive issues. Our student teachers were asked to indicate, on a questionnaire, the relative sensitivity of (a) teachers discussing various topics in the classroom, and (b) teachers sharing their support for a range of positions on issues. Our list did not include many standard "safe" textbook topics from history and social studies courses, that is, the Missouri Compromise, the Articles of Confederation, the United States Constitution, or the law of supply and demand.
Based on reviews of literature, our experiences in schools, responses to our questionnaire, and conversations with our student teachers, we have garnered the following impressions. Strictly taboo topics tend to be personal matters, topics considered obscene, dangerous, or inappropriate for classroom discussion. These include the following topics: abortion, pornography, open discussion of personal/family problems, obscene language, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, and criticism of school administration. Three of the seven topics relate directly to sexual issues (abortion, pornography, open discussion of student sexual experience).
Topics deemed moderately taboo are often "hot" social issues that tend to provoke strong emotional reactions. Eleven topics emerged in this category, including: sex and dating, race and intelligence, love and intimacy, prayer in schools, authentic portrayals of violence, teen pregnancy, white supremacy, expression of racist words or ideas by teacher or student, sexual assault, racial separatism, and date rape. More than three-fourths of the topics relate to either sex or race. The topics cited by student teachers as most likely to "put your job in jeopardy" were virtually all in these categories. We find it interesting that many of the most sensitive topics cluster around sex, race, and religion, areas of historic cultural conflict and taboo.
Common taboos, although somewhat less sensitive, may nevertheless represent closed areas of culture. Those topics ranged from generally abstract personal and religious concerns to social and political issues. For example, marriage, divorce, cohabitation, teen suicide, euthanasia, and domestic violence were some personal concerns. Less-sensitive religious taboos centered on discussion of the occult, the religious Right, atheism, and eastern religions. Social and political topics included AIDS, environmental radicalism, exploitation of the poor and minorities, feminism, affirmative action, communism, and welfare. Additional topics include racially mixed marriage, student use of drugs and alcohol, questioning representative democracy as the best form of government, evolution, racial and ethnic conflict, controversial leaders, criticism of traditional heroes, environmental holocaust, conspiracy theories, criticism of capitalism, and discussion of school issues and controversies.
These are issues that can generate great controversy, but they are generally perceived as public issues. They are also issues in the larger society, and several of them may be a step removed from students' lives. For example, feminism is perceived to be a safer topic than is abortion, and affirmative action a less-sensitive topic than is racial separatism. The relatively safe or noa topics tend to be even more distant from students' lives--for example, American foreign policy failures, wealth and power in America, health care reform, labor/management issues, and the role of media in society. Other topics are animal rights, socialism, schools as a social institution, foreign policy decisions, nuclear weapons, gun control, the military budget, and consumerism.
We have noticed that some of the safer topics reflect more recent developments, for which our culture may lack long-term value conflict. Many of the topics are embedded in the stuff of history and the discipline-based concepts, topics, and subject matter that make up most of the social studies curriculum. But the issues associated with them do not generally receive emphasis in textbooks and classrooms (Loewen 1995). Too frequently classroom treatment of these topics within a discipline-based framework tends to distance students from the community and from themselves, serving as a boundary between the social control function of schools and the ferment outside. Unfortunately, many of the truly noa topics that schools treat extensively are also virtually guaranteed to put students to sleep. When we add the general reluctance of many teachers to share their positions on issues, it is little wonder that schools contribute to a society of conformity.
The general pattern based on our impressions from student teachers, our review of literature, our experiences, and our own perceptions regarding taboo and noa topics appears to be as follows: The greater the distance in space and time from the individual lives of students the greater the focus in the curriculum and the less chance of emotional involvement or controversy. The converse also appears to be true: The closer to students' lives, the more meaningful, the more likely the topic is to be taboo. Areas of conflicting belief often reflect contested terrain supported by deeply embedded cultural values. Thus, the teaching of history and social science topics seemingly disconnected from students' lives may serve as a way for the culture to address social issues obliquely, avoiding the confrontation and turmoil that might result from the direct examination of social issues and creating a layer of comfort for teachers, students, and administrators as well as those in positions of power in the larger society.

EXPLAINING SILENCE
Teachers play a critical role in stifling or promoting the discussion of taboo topics. They decide whether such topics will be part of the intended curriculum, whether students can bring such issues into the classroom, and how the issues will be discussed (Bickmore 1993). Perhaps most important, they create a classroom environment that supports or inhibits the expression of student opinion. Several conditions may contribute to the silence of the curriculum on taboo topics. Certainly the fragmentation, segmentation, and compartmentalization of school subjects set a background for a system of taboos. The disciplinary borders that have traditionally defined school subjects are partly responsible. The disciplines have been dominated historically by an emphasis on objectivity and neutrality, an antiseptic de-emphasis on the emotional, a desensitization that occurs through schooling and culture to separate the mind from the heart under the guise of scientific neutrality (Zinn 1994).
In addition, the reality of schools as massive and tenacious bureaucracies with written rules and codes of conduct that emphasize a hierarchical stability, blandness, and sameness contributes to the taboo system (Zeigler 1967). In economic terms, schools are primarily aimed at developing human capital, workers who will do the nation's chores without asking too many troublesome questions, serving as a giant sorting machine (Anyon 1980; Apple 1979; Giroux 1981; Spring 1989). From that perspective, the critical thinking that occurs is an anomaly. Ironically, the more intimate and important a topic in young people's lives, the less likely it is to be studied in schools.
An anthropological perspective enlightens our understanding of sensitive and safe topics, which in turn may deepen our understanding of the relative lack of progress for issues-centered approaches in schools. A cultural explanation for the system of taboos includes intolerance of those who are culturally or ideologically different. This is a sort of educational nativism in which the Christian Right, the Gablers, in-school sanctioning agents, the textbook marketing and adoption process, the general lack of academic freedom, fear of losing one's job, ostracism, and self-censorship play major roles (Zeigler 1967). The student teachers with whom we work are very sensitive to the possibility of negative evaluations from sanctioning agents within the school community and outside. Zeigler's conclusion almost thirty years ago that the fear of sanctions restricts the likelihood that teachers would generate discussion of controversial issues still appears valid.
In the years since Zeigler, the legal atmosphere has also shifted. Supreme Court rulings may also have an impact on the culture of silence. In ruling on the First Amendment rights of free speech as regards schools, teachers, and students, the courts have faced the dilemma of striking a balance between First Amendment rights and indoctrination. Until the Hazelwood case (1987), the Supreme Court generally supported openness, and case law regarding censorship in schools leaned toward support of the First Amendment. Hazelwood, a case in which the Supreme Court held that a Missouri high school principal's action to censor a student newspaper did not abridge the First Amendment rights of the students because the newspaper could not be characterized as a public forum, set new distinctions and shifted the balance toward greater restriction and more administrative control. In Hazelwood, the Court established the precedent that schools can censor if that censoring relates to "legitimate pedagogical concerns," and gave school administrators broad powers to control school activities and to limit the freedom of teachers and students. Unfortunately, the effect of Hazelwood includes the limitation of topics, making some of them taboo and contributing to the repression of open inquiry and teacher freedom to lead students to question and explore ideas independently, essential aspects of issues-centered social studies (Krutz 1994). In fact, one survey of high school English teachers documented the fear of losing jobs or public censure because of controversial reading materials or inclusion of controversial topics in the curriculum (Noll 1994).
In summary, drawing on insights from our literature review, our experiences in schools, and the perceptions of student teachers with whom we work, we concluded that a system of taboo and noa topics does exist, that selection of social studies topics in schools may be guided, at least in part, by such a system, and that behind the taboos and noas is a cultural system resembling earlier societies with chiefs, secret societies, tribal elders, priests, rites of initiation, and rituals in new forms. It also appears to us that in this cultural system, taboo issues and topics are viewed as a threat to ancestral traditions, that taboos are transmissible, and that a prohibition against discussing sensitive and controversial topics may lead to a general aversion to discussion of issues. Unfortunately, under the influence of a system of taboos and noas, teachers may play a relatively weak and subservient role, subject to fear of sanctions and possessing an almost superstitious attitude toward the possible consequences of selecting controversial topics for study.

OPTIONS ON SILENCE
In most classrooms, taboo issues and topics are buried under an indigestible mass of facts, stories, and skills. Before we can seriously consider action to address the lack of treatment of these topics, we must appreciate the human need for comfort and the difficulty and turmoil these issues and topics create for teachers and students who inquire into them honestly, openly, and thoroughly. Staring into the heart of darkness can be a searing experience, can generate difficult and volatile conflict, and can unleash an emotional outpouring that many teachers will have difficulty controlling and directing.
One option to consider is to honor the need for silence and continue to ignore taboo subject matter and de-emphasize related issues and topics. That is an option that we cannot support. Another option is to address taboo subject matter carefully, when possible, and to do so within the dominant curricular structures currently found in schools. A third alternative deserving consideration is to open inquiry and discussion on taboo subject matter as thoroughly and competently as possible. That approach is best configured in an issues-oriented curriculum in which the issues raised by taboo topics become a central focus for student inquiry.
To create a more supportive environment for the exploration of taboo, ignored, and de-emphasized subject matter, the following may be helpful: materials appropriate to the taboo subject matter; revised textbooks created for problem posing; new curriculum guides and course plans; transformation of hierarchical control; and emphasis on academic freedom. Gantz (1978) describes five methods of taboo removal: relabeling the taboo, offering "diffuser" incentives, legalizing it, promoting the idea of popular approval of it, and creating a festive atmosphere around it. As Mesa-Bains and Shulman (1991) suggested, collaborative learning, case discussion, and other techniques hold promise for creating meaningful dialogue on real-life situations that are often sensitive. In addition, exercises created to make students aware of their attitudes about a taboo topic and to "move beyond the realms of mystery, ignorance, and taboo" may be helpful (Taylor 1981). A more novel approach is to plan a study of taboo subjects, much in the way that the "Subversive Film and Video Festival" was organized by the Danish Film Institute Workshop, and build around the ideal that "taboos are meant to be questioned and are often subject to criticism" (Vogel 1992). Somewhat similar is a curriculum focused on "closed" or "problematic areas of culture" (Hunt and Metcalf 1955).
Although work toward lifting taboos is important, we must recognize the deep-seated nature of the cultural forces at work in schools and society that create and maintain taboos. It may be very difficult to establish the openness necessary to create an issues-centered curriculum. Certainly the historical trend in social studies over recent years has been a move away from discourse on perennial human issues and toward a curriculum dominated by history and geography. In fact, the zenith of issues-centered social studies may have occurred during the 1930s and the glory years of Harold Rugg. Simply put, we cannot expect sudden or massive change. Nevertheless, we believe it is important for teachers to address many taboo topics and issues in the classroom and that an issues-centered approach to social studies holds great promise for improvement of practice in the field.

WHAT TO DO? PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS
We believe that it is essential for teachers and students in schools to explore taboo topics. This can be done most readily using the methods and activities found effective by advocates of issues-centered curricula, and by including study of a wide range of controversial topics contained in and related to the contents of the curriculum.
Although it is important for teachers to be aware of the legal restrictions on teacher freedom, the scope of Hazelwood is not unlimited and can be challenged (Hazelwood Guide 1988). The court's ruling in Hazelwood does not deny the possibility of other protection, such as state, school board, or campus regulations or policies that might guarantee free expression to teachers and students. It does not strip high school students of all First Amendment rights, and it does not mandate that school administrators, boards, and officials must assume broader power to censor teachers and students (Hazelwood Guide 1988). How supervision is exercised will teach young people a powerful lesson in freedom of speech or oppression ("Civics or Censorship" 1988).
The implications of the Hazelwood decision will continue to be tested, but it is apparent that the present Court favors administrative control. Some level of censorship in schools is a reality, and teachers are faced with difficult choices. Nonetheless, there are specific things teachers can do. We believe that many of the recommendations made to teachers regarding Hazelwood and censorship are relevant for all social studies teachers facing the general cultural restraint on teaching taboo topics. We gathered our list of suggestions from various sources, including Krutz (1994, 224-25) and What to Do? (1988, 39-40), as well as the other sources cited in the text. A few items are listed as written in the original text.
* Do not self-censor, avoiding topics thought to be controversial. If others want to censor, let that be their decision.
* Do not try to guess what might be offensive to someone else. Anything can be offensive to someone. This leads to a watered-down curriculum.
* When selecting materials for students, use common sense. For example, sexually explicit materials or materials containing strong language that might not pass the test of community standards for obscenity may lead to censure. Develop a familiarity with school policy regarding such materials prior to using them in the classroom.
* Taboos and the cultural sensitivity surrounding taboo topics can be thoughtfully discussed with students to promote awareness, sensitivity, and openness. Include struggles over censorship and school policy as a topic in the curriculum, for study and student action (Repa 1990).
* Draw on the methods and activities found effective in teaching controversial topics by advocates of issues-centered curricula (Evans and Saxe 1996).
* Include reading and discussion of a wide range of alternative perspectives on the issue or topic under consideration including conservative, liberal, radical, and extremist views. Encourage students to make up their own minds.
* Use probing questions as a hinge for organizing lessons and materials, questions calling for a wide range of viewpoints. For example, "To what extent should our laws protect the rights of lesbians, gays, and bisexuals?"
* Bring in relevant evidence, resources, and materials that shed light on the question being investigated.
* Include discussion of the values supporting competing alternatives and the consequences that may result from each choice (Engle and Ochoa 1988).
* Develop caring and effective procedures for managing student behavior and creating a classroom environment that is open, safe, and supportive of free expression. Students must feel comfortable sharing unpopular perspectives and beliefs, even when they conflict with the teacher's.
* Develop clear guidelines for behavior appropriate to the lesson format. For example, "One person will speak at a time. When one person speaks, everyone else listens. We will discuss ideas, not personalities."
* Consider minimizing or withholding teacher opinions and perspectives until after students have substantially shared and examined their beliefs through investigation of relevant sources and subsequent discourse. The teacher's perspective can then be evaluated as one of several possible views to be considered.
* At the school and district level, teacher involvement in curricular planning and decision making will also help promote academic freedom, creative thinking, and quality teaching (McMurty 1992).
* Urge schools to adopt an explicit policy for protection and encouragement of free expression, and supporting inclusion of controversial topics in the curriculum (Jones 1993). One strategy for resolving censorship attempts includes developing procedures for handling challenged materials or topics. Offer to help develop a school policy if none exists.
* If censored, appeal. Ask for specific objections in writing. If the problem concerns choice of topic, calmly and professionally discuss the educational rationale with the objector. An administrator can only censor if the school board permits. Appeal to the board, or the superintendent, but do not give up too soon. Draw on Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Hazelwood as a source of arguments favoring free expression. He called the Hazelwood decision a "license for thought control in the high schools" (Hazelwood 1988, 268).
* Use public pressure to your advantage. Get parents, community, librarians, the press, other media, fellow faculty, and students to petition or take other public action, including debate. Probably no school wants to be labeled as censoring.
* Support and reward administrators and others who are committed to upholding and defending freedom of speech in the schools. Establish an award to honor them.
* Seek assistance from organized groups such as teachers, unions, local, state, and national affiliates of the National Council for the Social Studies, the Student Law Center, the state and national Coalitions against Censorship, and the American Civil Liberties Union.
* Create alternative forums not affected by Hazelwood, public forums that are open to all, whether school-sponsored or underground.
* Push for state legislation to protect students' and teachers' rights of free expression.
And, finally, do not give up your rights as a citizen and as a teacher. The power of school authorities to control the curriculum is not unlimited, but is fraught with ambiguity. Exploration of controversial and taboo topics in social studies is an important exercise of free expression and provides students with powerful lessons on living in a democratic society. Tacit acceptance of a system of taboos and noas sends a powerful message as well, one burdened with silence. As Theodore Mitchell (1988), of Dartmouth, wrote:

Intolerance of student expression is at odds with one of the central missions of every school: to teach democratic values, principles and actions. Ideals and practice cannot be divorced. A school preaching democracy while practicing tyranny is one in which hypocrisy and duplicity become de facto parts of the curriculum. Schools which fail to protect the constitutional rights of individuals (according to John Dewey) "strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of government as mere platitude." (12)

ADDED MATERIAL
Ronald W. Evans is a professor in the School of Teacher Education at San Diego State University in California. Patricia G. Avery is an associate professor of social studies education in the College of Education and Human Development at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis. Patricia Velde Pederson is a senior assessment specialist at Harcourt Educational Measurement in San Antonio, Texas. This article originally appeared in The Social Studies, September/October 1999, pgs. 218-224. Reprinted with permission of the Helen Dwight Reid Educational Foundation. Published by Heldref Publications, 1319 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-1802. Copyright 1999.

REFERENCES
Anyon, J. 1980. Social class and the hidden curriculum of work. Journal of Education 162: 67-92.
Apple, M. 1979. Ideology and curriculum. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul.
Bickmore, K. 1993. Learning inclusion: Inclusion in learning: Citizenship education in a pluralistic society. Theory and Research in Social Education 21: 341-84.
Blair, L. 1996. Strategies for dealing with censorship. Art Education 49(5): 57-61.
Brown, R. 1984. Forbidden fruits: Taboos and tabooism in culture. Bowling Green: Popular Press.
Civics or censorship: It's your choice. 1988. American School Board Journal 175(4): 12.
Ehman, L. 1977. Social studies instructional factors causing change in high school students' sociopolitical attitudes over a two-year period. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New York. ED 142480.
Engle, S., and A. Ochoa. 1988. Education for democratic citizenship: Decision-making in the social studies. New York: Teachers College Press.
Evans, R. W., and D. Saxe. 1996. Handbook on teaching social issues. Washington, D.C.: National Council for Social Studies, Bulletin #93.
Farberow, N. 1963. Taboo topics. New York: Atherton Press.
Freire, P. 1970. Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Continuum.
Gantz, W. 1978. The movement of taboos: A message-oriented approach. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism, Seattle.
Giroux, H. 1981. Ideology, culture, and the process of schooling. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Goldenson, D. R. 1978. An alternative view about the role of the secondary school in political socialization: A field experimental study of the development of civil liberties attitudes. Theory and Research in Social Education 6(1): 44-72.
Goodlad, J. 1984. A place called school: Prospects for the future. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Gross, R. E. 1989. Reasons for the limited acceptance of the problems approach. The Social Studies 80: 185-86.
Grossman, D. L. 1976. Educational climates and attitudes toward dissent: A study of political socialization of conflict norms in adolescents. Doctoral dissertation. Stanford University, 1975.
Guttman, A. 1987. Democratic education. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Hahn, C. L. 1991. Controversial issues in social studies. In Handbook of Research on Social Studies Teaching and Learning, edited by J. P. Shaver. New York: Macmillan.
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 1988. 484 U.S. 260, 108 S. Ct. 562, 98 L. Ed. 2d 592.
Hazelwood: A complete guide to the Supreme Court decision. 1988. Student Press Law Center Report. Washington, D.C.: Student Press Law Center, Spring.
Hertzberg, H. 1981. Social studies reform: 1890-1980. Boulder: Social Science Education Consortium.
Hunt, M. P., and L. E. Metcalf. 1955. Teaching high school social studies: Problems in reflective thinking and social understanding. New York: Harper and Row.
Jones, J. L. 1993. Targets of the right. American School Board Journal 180(4): 22-29.
Krutz, M. 1994. Hazelwood: Results and realities. In Preserving intellectual freedom: Fighting censorship in our schools, edited by J. Brown. Urbana, Ill.: National Council of Teachers of English.
Loewen, J. W. 1995. Lies my teacher told me: Everything your American history textbook got wrong. New York: New Press.
Massialas, B. G., N. F. Sprague, and J. A. Sweeney. 1970. Structure and process of inquiry into social issues in secondary schools; Inquiry into social issues. Vol. 1. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
McGinnis, J. R. 1992. The taboo and "noa" of teaching Science-Technology-Society STS: A constructivist approach to understanding the rules of conduct teachers live by. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southeastern Association for the Education of Teachers of Science, Wakulla Springs, Florida.
McMurtry, J. 1992. The will to bureaucratic control. Canadian Social Studies 27(1): 2-3.
Mitchell, T. R. 1988. The high court and Hazelwood: Chipping away at rights. Christian Science Monitor, 25 January, 12.
Mesa-Bains, A., and J. H. Shulman. 1991. Teaching diverse students: Cases and commentaries. San Francisco: Far West Lab.
Noll, E. 1994. The ripple effect of censorship: Silencing in the classroom. English Journal 83(8): 59-64.
Oliver, D., and J. P. Shaver. 1966. Teaching public issues in the high school. Boston: Houghton-Mufflin.
Onosko, J. J. 1996. Exploring issues with students despite the barriers. Social Education 60: 22-27.
Repa, B. K. 1990. The first amendment finds a new battleground: The classroom. Social Education 54(6): 354-55.
Rugg, H. 1921. On reconstructing the social studies. Historical Outlook 12: 253-60.
Shaver, J. 1989. Lessons from the past: The future of an issues-centered social studies curriculum. The Social Studies 80: 192-96.
Shaver, J., O. L. Davis, and S. Helburn. 1979. The status of social studies education: Impressions from three NSF studies. Social Education 43: 150-53.
Spring, J. 1989. The sorting machine revisited: National education policy since 1945. New York: Longman.
Taylor, C. J. 1981. Teaching more than the facts of menstruation: Exercises to stimulate dialogue about a taboo subject. Teaching of Psychology 5: 105-06.
Torney, J. V., A. N. Oppenheim, and R. F. Farnen. 1975. Civic education in ten countries: An empirical study. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Vogel, A. 1992. Subversive film festival. Cineaste 1989.
Webster, W. 1973. Taboo: A sociological study. New York: Octagon Books.
What to do if it happens to you. 1988 (Spring). Fighting censorship after Hazelwood. Student Press Law Center Report. Washington, D.C.: Student Press Law Center.
Wilen, W., and J. White. 1991. Classroom discourse and interaction in social studies. In Handbook of research on social studies teaching and learning, edited by J. P. Shaver. New York: Macmilllan.
Zeigler, H. 1967. The political life of American teachers. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Zinn, H. 1994. You can't be neutral on a moving train. Boston: Beacon Press.